Defamation Actions Arising from Arbitration and Related Dispute Resolution Procedures - Preemption, Collateral Estoppel and Privilege: Why the Absolute Privilege Should Be Expanded by Lewis, John B. & Cole, Lois J.
DePaul Law Review 
Volume 45 
Issue 3 Spring 1996 Article 5 
Defamation Actions Arising from Arbitration and Related Dispute 
Resolution Procedures - Preemption, Collateral Estoppel and 
Privilege: Why the Absolute Privilege Should Be Expanded 
John B. Lewis 
Lois J. Cole 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review 
Recommended Citation 
John B. Lewis & Lois J. Cole, Defamation Actions Arising from Arbitration and Related Dispute Resolution 
Procedures - Preemption, Collateral Estoppel and Privilege: Why the Absolute Privilege Should Be 
Expanded , 45 DePaul L. Rev. 677 (1996) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol45/iss3/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, 
please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
DEFAMATION ACTIONS ARISING FROM
ARBITRATION AND RELATED DISPUTE
RESOLUTION PROCEDURES - PREEMPTION,
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND PRIVILEGE: WHY
THE ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE SHOULD BE EXPANDED
By John B. Lewis*
and Lois J. Cole**
I. INTRODUCTION
Arbitration and related dispute resolution procedures have long
been viewed as less expensive and more expedient alternatives to liti-
gation. Today, the increasing costs of litigation, the uncertainty of jury
verdicts, and recent court decisions' have encouraged even more par-
ties to choose non-judicial procedures to resolve their disputes. This is
true not only in the employment context, but also in the broader arena
of commercial disputes. 2
* Partner, Arter & Hadden, Cleveland, Ohio; B.A., J.D., University of Missouri; LL.M., Co-
lumbia University.
** Associate, Arter & Hadden, Cleveland, Ohio; B.M. Ed., Indiana University; J.D., Cleve-
land Marshall College of Law.
The authors were counsel for the defendant in Henegar v. Banta, 817 F. Supp. 668 (N.D. Ohio,
1993), affd, 27 F.3d 223 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 664 (1994). Mr. Lewis was a partici-
pant in the DePaul University College of Law First Annual Clifford Seminar on "ADR and
Torts: Implications for Practice and Reform."
1. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (holding an ADEA claim
can be subjected to compulsory arbitration). In Gilmer, the Supreme Court held that statutory
claims of age discrimination in employment could be the subject of an arbitration agreement
enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1994). The Court also
acknowledged that the FAA's provisions "manifest a 'liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
agreements.'" Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)). In comparing arbitral and judicial procedures, the Court
declared: "Although those procedures might not be as extensive as in the federal courts, by
agreeing to arbitrate, a party 'trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom
for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration.'" Id. at 31 (quoting Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)); see also Rodriguez de
Quijas v. Shearson/American Express Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (arbitration of claims under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1994)); Shearson/American Express Inc. v.
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (arbitration of claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Cor-
rupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1994)); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (arbitration of claims under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1-36 (1994)).
2. See ELIZABETH S. ROLPH ET AL., ESCAPING THE COURTHOUSE: PRIVATE ALTERNATIVE
DisputE RESOLUTION IN Los ANGELES (Rand Corp., 1994) (examining the use of alternative
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The strong feelings aired in arbitration and pre-arbitration proce-
dures sometimes persuade the participants to sue other parties and
witnesses for defamation - as a means of visiting retribution, pre-
serving their reputations, stifling future criticism, or to collaterally at-
tack a negative award from the arbitrators. While courts may view
arbitration as a legitimate substitute for legal action and welcome the
reduction in their dockets, they still do not have a uniform approach
to libel and slander litigation arising from the arbitral process.3 Even
dispute resolution proceedings in Los Angeles). This study acknowledges the growing interest in
private alternative dispute resolution:
In settings where the courts are clogged and criminal cases are forcing civil cases off the
calendar, when public juries are perceived as "out of control," and where many are
disillusioned with incremental tort reform, a growing number of private individuals are
selling their services as neutrals to facilitate dispute resolution.
Id. at 1. A number of other articles have considered the use of arbitration to resolve disputes in
a non-union work place. See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher, Arbitration of Employment Disputes With-
out Unions, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 753 (1990) (discussing various legal responses to arbitration of
employment disputes in non-union settings); Martin H. Malin & Robert F. Ladenson, Privatizing
Justice: A Jurisprudential Perspective on Labor and Employment Arbitration from the Steelwork-
ers Trilogy to Gilmer, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1187 (1993) (considering differences in the roles of labor
and employment arbitrators); Evan J. Spelfogel, New Trends in the Arbitration of Employment
Disputes, 48 ARB. J. 6 (1993) (discussing the proliferation of dispute resolution use by employers
as a means of reducing burdens on the judiciary and controlling the rising costs of litigation).
Many company executives have signed the Center for Public Resources Policy Statement which
declares, in part: "We recognize that for many business disputes there is a less expensive, more
effective method of resolution than the traditional lawsuit. Alternative dispute resolution
(ADR) procedures involve collaborative techniques which can often spare businesses the high
costs of litigation." Todd B. Carver & Albert A. Vondra, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Why It
Doesn't Work and Why It Does, HARV. Bus. REV., May-June, 1994, at 124; see also U.S. GEN-
ERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, MOST PRIVATE-SECTOR
EMPLOYERS USE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1995) (discussing types of alternative
dispute resolution used).
American Arbitration Association (AAA) statistics for 1994 showed that it handled a total of
59,424 cases composed of 56,417 arbitrations and 3,007 mediations. AAA CUMULATIVE CASE
FILINOs (1995). Of these cases, 26% or 14,852 cases were labor; 6% or 3,564 were construction;
13% or 7,186 were miscellaneous commercial; and 1% or 565 were employment. Id. The total
commercial cases filed with the AAA in 1994 equaled 13,192. Id. This total number of commer-
cial cases represented an increase over the 1993 and 1992 filings which were 12,752 and 12,872,
respectively. Id.
3. Arbitration, as used in this Article, refers to a non-judicial method of resolving disputes by
submitting them to one or more impartial decision-makers. This submission may be required by
statute, contract, or may be voluntarily agreed upon by the parties after the dispute arises. See
LAURA J. COOPER & DENNIS R. NOLAN, LABOR ARBITRATION: A COURSEBOOK 1 (1994) (de-
fining arbitration); HENRY H. PERRIT, JR., 1 EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACTICE 199 (3d
ed. 1992) (discussing types of arbitration).
The common law courts initially viewed arbitration with skepticism and hostility. This judicial
hostility was only neutralized by legislation which required the enforcement of agreements to
arbitrate, such as the New York Arbitration Act which was passed in 1920, N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. &
R. 7501-7514 (McKinney 1980 & Supp. 1986) and the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14
(1994). Labor arbitration gained acceptance after the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, 61
Stat. 136 (1947), and a series of U.S. Supreme Court cases, which recognized a policy favoring
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though defamation actions of this type are not permitted in the judi-
cial arena, courts are frequently divided on whether an absolute privi-
lege should be applied to foreclose or limit subsequent litigation.
It is the position of the authors that if arbitration and related dis-
pute resolution procedures are to be truly effective, they must be ac-
corded the same dignity and protection provided analogous court
proceedings. Existing case law provides a degree of protection for the
parties, witnesses and other participants through federal preemption,
collateral estoppel, and privilege. A review of the case law reveals,
however, that these defenses do not provide sufficient protection for
the process.
Preemption is only available in the employment context and has
been limited by a trio of Supreme Court decisions handed down be-
tween 1985 and 1994.4 Collateral estoppel, while developing in the
arbitration arena, still remains an unreliable defense since the arbitra-
tor may not be called upon to decide the truth of the allegedly defam-
atory statements. Indeed, it has no application to dispute resolution
procedures that do not involve legal decision-making.
While offering protection, the qualified privilege does not foreclose
litigation altogether and may be overcome by proof of malice or ex-
cessive publication.5 This defense leaves the possibility that a jury
may finally resolve a dispute properly submitted to arbitration. A
narrowly applied absolute privilege can lead to the same result if
statements outside the hearing such as in investigations, grievances,
claims, conferences, briefs or hearing notices are not covered. Thus,
an absolute privilege, broadened to cover pre- and post-hearing con-
duct, should be applied to discourage subsequent suits against the par-
ties, witnesses, and other participants when as a matter of law, policy
the arbitration of industrial disputes. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,
363 U.S. 593 (1960) (holding that the interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement is a
question for the arbitrator and courts should not overrule the arbitrator's interpretation merely
because they differ with it); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960) (holding that in a § 301(a) of the LMRA action, the court's inquiry is confined to the
question of whether the reluctant party did agree to arbitration to resolve a grievance, with
doubts as to whether the particular grievance is covered under an arbitration clause being re-
solved in favor of coverage); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960)
(holding that court's inquiry in a suit to compel arbitration of a labor dispute pursuant to a
collective bargaining agreement is limited to ascertaining whether the claim of the party seeking
arbitration is on its face governed by the contract); see also COOPER & NOLAN, supra, at 1-13
(discussing history and background of labor arbitration); ROLPH ET AL., supra note 2, at 9-10
(examining history of arbitration).
4. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 114 S. Ct. 2239 (1994); Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic
Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988); Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985).
5. See infra note 15 (discussing the elements of the qualified privilege in Illinois).
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or by agreement the dispute should be finally resolved through the
arbitration process.
II. THE LAW OF DEFAMATION
To establish a claim for defamation, 6 a plaintiff must prove a false
and defamatory statement was made about him; an unprivileged pub-
lication of that statement to a third party; and either that the state-
ment is actionable irrespective of special harm or that the publication
caused the special harm. 7 Once the plaintiff has established a prima
facie case of defamation, several defenses are available to the defend-
ant including (1) the truth of the statement;8 (2) that the plaintiff con-
6. The Restatement provides that a statement is defamatory "if it tends so to harm the reputa-
tion of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons
from associating or dealing with him." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977). Defa-
mation consists of either libel or slander. Id. The Restatement defines libel and slander as
follows:
(1) Libel consists of the publication of defamatory matter by written or printed words,
by its embodiment in physical form or by any other form of communication that has the
potentially harmful qualities characteristic of written or printed words.
(2) Slander consists of the publication of defamatory matter by spoken words, transi-
tory gestures or by any form of communication other than those stated in Subsection
(1).
Id. § 568(1)-(2).
7. See id. § 558 (listing the elements for a cause of action for defamation). The Restatement
also requires fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher. Id. § 613(1)(g).
This fault requirement is based on Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). The
Supreme Court decision in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749
(1985), however, raises questions about this position. Many commentators believe that the
Gertz fault requirement is inapplicable when the plaintiff is a private figure and when the defam-
atory statement does not involve a matter of public concern. See FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL,
THE LAW OF TORTS § 5.0, at 20-22 (1986) (discussing the fault requirement in Gertz).
8. See Watkins v. Laser/Print Atlanta, Inc., 358 S.E.2d 477, 479 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987) (stating
that "it is axiomatic that truth is an absolute defense in a defamation action"); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A (1977) (stating that no liability attaches to a defamatory statement
of fact that is true). Some states also provide by statute that truth is an absolute defense in a
defamation action. E.g., OHio REV. CODE AN. § 2739.02 (Anderson 1988). Article I, Section 4
of the Illinois State Constitution qualifies the absolute defense of truth by stating: "In trials for
libel, both civil and criminal, the truth, when published with good motives and for justifiable
ends, shall be a sufficient defense." ILL. CONST. art. I, § 4. An important limitation on truth as
an absolute defense is that a defendant's good faith belief in the truth of the statement is not
sufficient since the statement must in fact be true. Watkins, 358 S.E.2d at 479. Conversely, truth
is an absolute defense even if the defendant believes the statement to be false when he or she
makes it. See John Bruce Lewis et al., Defamation and the Workplace: A Survey of the Law and
Proposals for Reform, 54 Mo. L. REV. 797, 809-10 (1989) (examining the development of work-
place defamation law and arguing for a uniform statute for workplace defamation).
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sented to the defamatory statement;9 or (3) the existence of an
absolute or qualified privilege. 10
In alternative dispute resolution proceedings, the most important
defense to a plaintiff's defamation action may be a privilege. A privi-
lege allows a defendant to avoid liability in certain circumstances even
though its statements were false and defamatory; a privilege may be
either "absolute" or "qualified."" Whether a privilege applies, and
the type of privilege available, depends upon who made the defama-
tory statement, to whom it was made, and the circumstances under
which it was made.12
An absolute privilege is a complete bar to recovery.13 Absolutely
privileged statements are not actionable no matter how false they
might be or how malicious the publication. 14 A qualified or condi-
tional privilege, however, protects only those statements made with-
out ill motive or malice.' 5
9. The Restatement states that "the consent of another to the publication of defamatory matter
concerning him is a complete defense to his action for defamation. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 583 (1977). Consent can be implied from the individual's membership in an organiza-
tion which requires the statement of reasons for terminations. See, e.g., Joftes v. Kaufman, 324
F. Supp. 660, 663 (D.D.C. 1971) (union required reasons for dismissal); Turner v. Gateway
Transp. Co., Inc., 569 S.W.2d 358, 360 (Mo. App. 1978) (employee consented to procedures
established by union and employer, including sending discharge letter to Motor Carrier
Council).
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 594-96 (1977).
11. Id.; see also infra note 15 (discussing the elements required for use of the privilege
defense).
12. See Bolton v. Walker, 164 N.W. 420 (Mich. 1917) (holding statements made at a regular
meeting of the city's board of estimates that involved matters of public interest properly before
it, were privileged); Lewis et al., supra note 8, at 825 (discussing privileges in defamation law).
13. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 114, at 815-
16 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing absolute privilege generally); see also infra notes 53-62 and accom-
panying text (discussing the development of the absolute privilege in judicial proceedings).
14. KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, at 816-23; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 585-91 (1977) (discussing the scope of absolute privilege as it applies to judicial officers, attor-
neys, parties to judicial proceedings, witnesses, jurors, legislators and executive officers); ROD-
NEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 8.01, at 8-3 to 8-5 (1994) (discussing common law
privileges).
15. See SMOL.A, supra note 14, §§ 8.07, 8.09, at 8-19 to 8-20 and 8-31 to 8-33 (1994) (provid-
ing a general overview of conditional privilege and discussing abuse of privilege). In Illinois the
courts have established five elements for a conditional privilege. They are (a) good faith by the
writer or speaker; (b) an interest or duty to be upheld; (c) a statement limited in scope to its
purpose; (d) a proper occasion; and (e) publication in a proper way and to proper parties.
MICHAEL J. POLELLE & BRUCE L. OTIrLEY, ILLINOIS TORT LAW § 5.40, at 5-59 (2d ed. 1993); see
also Zeinfeld v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., 243 N.E.2d 217, 221 (Ill. 1968) (applying the five-
element test for conditional privilege).
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A. The History of Privilege in Defamation Actions
Courts in this country long have recognized the privilege defense in
defamation actions.16 Early courts rarely applied an absolute privi-
lege except for statements made in judicial and legislative proceedings
or certain official communications of executive officers of the federal
and state governments. 17
As the twentieth century approached, defamation actions arose
more frequently in the employment context. Many were based upon
statements made by an employer in response to an employee's inquiry
concerning the reason for his discharge. 18 Courts often found the
statements qualifiedly privileged when made in good faith in reference
to a matter of common interest to the parties or in discharge of the
employer's duty.19
16. In Weiman v. Mabie, 8 N.W. 71 (Mich. 1881), the Michigan Supreme Court found state-
ments contained in an affidavit presented to a superintendent of schools indicating that a pro-
spective teacher made "habitual use of profane and bad language" and was guilty of "open and
conspicuous Sabbath-breaking" qualifiedly privileged. Id. at 72. The court held that because the
statements were made by individuals interested in the schools to the person qualified to act on
the licensing of the prospective teacher, and were made for an honest purpose, the statements
were "privileged." Id.; see also Bohlinger v. Germania Life Ins. Co., 140 S.W. 257 (Ark. 1911)
(holding that credit report requested by employer/insurer which was forwarded on to other per-
sons involved with the company was a privileged communication because all those viewing the
report had an interest in the information in the report by reason of their duties to defendant
company); Christopher v. Akin, 101 N.E. 971 (Mass. 1913) (holding that whether statement
made by the defendant charging the plaintiff with taking certain articles from a client was privi-
leged was a question for the jury); Gattis v. Kilgo, 52 S.E. 249 (N.C. 1905) (holding the publica-
tion of college board of trustees' proceedings in the investigation of charges against one
connected with the college was qualifiedly privileged); Butterworth v. Todd, 70 A. 139 (N.J. Sup.
1908) (holding that a complaint made by church members about another church member in
accordance with the discipline of the church is subject to qualified privilege if made in the ab-
sence of malice); Lewis & Herrick v. Chapman, 16 N.Y. 369 (1857) (holding that a banker's
written communication to a mercantile house regarding the credit history of a customer is privi-
leged); Laughlin v. Schnitzer, 106 S.W. 908 (Tex. Ct. App. 1907) (holding that defendant's state-
ment that plaintiff was not a decent woman was conditionally privileged when it was made in
conjunction with the defendant's decision to cancel a lease made with the plaintiff).
17. See HARPER ET AL., supra note 7, §§ 5.22, 5.23, at 181-200 (discussing absolute privilege as
it applies to judicial, legislative, administrative and executive proceedings); see also Blakeslee v.
Carroll, 64 Conn. 223 (1894) (holding that conditional privilege applied to statements made by
witnesses appearing before board of alderman); Maurice v. Worden, 54 Md. 233 (1880) (holding
that absolute privilege did not apply to a supervisor's written comments made on a letter of
resignation received from an employee); Torrey v. Field, 10 Vt. 353 (1838) (discussing the scope
of absolute immunity).
18. See, e.g., Beeler v. Jackson, 2 A. 916 (Md. 1886).
19. In Beeler v. Jackson, 2 A. 916 (Md. 1886), a railroad employee brought an action for
slander against his employer based upon the railroad's stated reason for the employee's dis-
charge-that the employee was "discharged for stealing fish, nuts and breaking off car-doors,
and taking them home." Id. at 916. The employee alleged that the statements were made in the
presence of other employees. Id. at 917. The court found the statements protected by a quali-
fied privilege holding that, upon inquiry from the employee, the employer had a duty "to truth-
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B. Development of a Qualified Privilege for Investigations and
Grievance Procedures Pursuant to Labor Agreements
By the early 1900's, courts were confronted with defamation actions
where the alleged defamatory statements were made in the course of
investigations or grievance proceedings provided for by a labor agree-
ment. The courts consistently found the statements qualifiedly privi-
leged when the individual making the statement had an interest in the
subject matter of the communication and the person to whom it was
made had a corresponding interest or some duty concerning the
communication. 20
The Illinois Court of Appeals in Wuttke v. Ladanyi2t found state-
ments made in an investigation hearing privileged.22 Wuttke, an em-
ployee of a sausage company, was discharged after his employer
discovered a considerable amount of spoiled meat.23 After Wuttke
filed a notice of his discharge with the union, the president of the
union, who was required to investigate any labor dispute in an attempt
to settle it, met with him and a company manager to investigate the
discharge.24 Wuttke alleged that during that meeting, the company
manager stated that he had syphilis. 25
The Court of Appeals upheld the lower court's finding that the em-
ployer's statements during the meeting were qualifiedly privileged be-
cause they were "uttered privately for a good and proper purpose, to a
person or to persons having an interest in the subject matter."26 The
court explained that alleged slanderous communications made confi-
fully and frankly tell him the reason" for his discharge. Id. As to the publication of the
statement, the court noted that the plaintiff could not complain that his inquiry was answered
"where and when it was asked." Id. at 917-18; see also Bacon v. Michigan Cent. Ry. Co., 33
N.W. 181, 184 (Mich. 1887) (finding discharge list protected by qualified privilege because it was
communication made by "a person interested in behalf of [the company] ... to another person
alike interested in behalf of the company regarding matters pertaining to his duties as an agent
of the company authorized to employ men"); Ramsdell v. Pennsylvania Ry. Co., 75 A. 444 (N.J.
Sup. 1910) (holding that a notification of discharge is privileged as to other employees of the
department); Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Richmond, 11 S.W. 555 (Tex. 1889) (finding communica-
tion circulated among railroad personnel indicating that former conductor was terminated for
carelessness qualifiedly privileged based upon the railroad's duty to see that only competent and
careful employees were employed as conductors).
20. See infra notes 21-52 and accompanying text (providing case illustrations where a qualified
privilege attached).
21. 226 Ill. App. 402 (1922).
22. Id. at 405.
23. Id. at 403.
24. Id. at 403-404.
25. Id. at 404.
26. Id. at 405.
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dentially in response to an inquiry are privileged since the party "has
invited the communication. '27
Similarly, in Polk v. Missouri Pacific Railroad,2 8 the court found
statements made to a witness during an investigation hearing privi-
leged. 29 There, the superintendent of the railroad held a hearing, pur-
suant to the labor contract, to investigate the reason for the discharge
of a member of the plaintiff's railroad crew. 30 During the hearing, the
superintendent accused the plaintiff of defrauding the company.31
The Supreme Court of Arkansas found the superintendent's state-
ment qualifiedly privileged because it was made in good faith in refer-
ence to a matter in which both parties had an interest, and in
reference to a corresponding duty on the part of the superintendent.32
The South Carolina Supreme Court extended a qualified privilege
to affidavits submitted in support of statements made during an inves-
tigation hearing in True v. Southern Railroad Co.33 True, a railway
conductor, was discharged for irregularities in his transportation reve-
nue returns. 34 An investigation was convened pursuant to an agree-
ment between the railroad and the union.35 Charges of dishonesty
and stealing were made during the course of the investigation hearing
and those statements were supported by various reports and
affidavits. 36
The court found both the statements made during the hearing and
the affidavits supporting those statements qualifiedly privileged since
the investigation was called in response to an obligation of the com-
27. Id. The court further noted that a dangerous precedent would be set if it held that an
employer could not give a private and confidential explanation to a discharged employee or his
representative who had solicited an explanation of the discharge "without laying himself open to
a charge of slander." Id. at 405-06.
28. 245 S.W. 186 (Ark. 1922).
29. Id. at 188.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. In Bird v. Medal Gold Prod. Corp., 302 N.Y.S.2d 701 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969), the court
also found statements made by the employer at a pre-arbitration conference qualifiedly privi-
leged where the statements were germane to the employee's reinstatement; see also Henthorn v.
West Md. Ry. Co., 174 A.2d 175 (Md. 1961) (holding that an employer is entitled to a qualified
privilege in making certain statements about an employee in an inquiry investigating the dis-
charge of the employee as long as the statements were made in good faith); Elmore v. Atlantic
Coast Line Ry. Co., 127 S.E. 710 (N.C. 1925) (holding that statements made by railroad's super-
intendent in a conversation with a ticket agent pursuant to investigation of the plaintiff were
qualifiedly privileged).
33. 157 S.E. 618 (S.C. 1931).
34. Id. at 619.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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pany under the labor agreement.37 The court noted that if the com-
pany had discharged the plaintiff without complying with the
provision of the agreement requiring an investigation, it would have
subjected itself to a suit for damages. 38
The New Jersey Superior Court further extended a qualified privi-
lege to correspondence concerning an employee's discharge. In Mur-
phy v. Johns-Manville,39 a millwright was caught removing company
property without permission.40 A hearing was conducted, as required
by the labor agreement, and minutes were taken.41 The minutes sub-
sequently were transcribed and sent by the company supervisor of in-
dustrial relations to the union and to certain management personnel.4 2
The company also forwarded a letter to the union president stating
that the employee was being discharged for theft.43 The employee
then brought an action for libel based upon the letter and the minutes
of the hearing. 44
The court affirmed judgment for the employer finding both the min-
utes and the letter qualifiedly privileged.45 It found that the letter was
sent in accordance with the company's duty under the labor agree-
ment.46 The court also held that the minutes were sent only to indi-
viduals who "had a sufficient interest in the matter" so as to make the
minutes qualifiedly privileged.47
Some courts have also found statements made in notices of investi-
gation meetings and employee terminations qualifiedly privileged. In
Hardee v. North Carolina Allstate Services, Inc.,48 the court considered
allegedly libelous statements contained in notices of an investigation
sent to an employee, his union, his manager, and the company leasing
the employee's services.49 The investigation was to consider the em-
37. Id. at 620.
38. Id.
39. 133 A.2d 34 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1957).
40. Id. at 36.
41. Id. at 37.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 40-41.
46. Id. at 42.
47. Id. at 41; see also Jorgensen v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 138 A.2d 24, 36-40 (N.J. 1958)
(applying a qualified privilege to statements made in a letter sent to the employee at the conclu-
sion of an investigation hearing held pursuant to the union contract).
48. 537 F.2d 1255 (4th Cir. 1976).
49. Id. at 1257-58.
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ployee's falsification of his driver log and theft of company property. 50
The court held that the notice of investigation and a notice of the em-
ployee's termination sent to the same recipients were qualifiedly privi-
leged. 51 According to the court, the notices contained a reasonable
description of the employee's behavior. 52
III. THE ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE
A. Development of Immunity and Absolute Privilege in
Judicial Proceedings
Following English precedent, American courts established complete
protection and immunity from civil liability for statements made or
actions taken by judges during the course of judicial proceedings. In
1872, Supreme Court Justice Field, writing for the majority in Bradley
v. Fisher,53 addressed judiciary immunity:
For it is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper
administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the au-
thority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions,
without apprehension of personal consequences to himself. Liabil-
ity to answer to every one who might feel himself aggrieved by the
action of the judge, would be inconsistent with the possession of this
freedom, and would destroy that independence without which no
judiciary can be either respectable or useful. 54
The principle of judicial immunity "guarantees impartiality by assur-
ing that the judge need not fear the cost and burden of defending a
lawsuit brought by a disappointed litigant. '55
50. Id. Although the company was apparently required to notify the employee, his union, and
his manager of the investigation, it was not required to notify the company leasing the plaintiff's
truck driving services. Id. at 1259 n.4.
51. Id. at 1259.
52. Id. at 1258-59.
53. 80 U.S. 335 (1871). Bradley was the United States Supreme Court's first landmark judicial
immunity case. The defendant, Fisher, had been the presiding judge of a case in which the
plaintiff, Bradley, had been defending a man accused of the murder of President Lincoln. Id. at
336-37. Bradley, outside the presence of the jury and outside the record of the court, allegedly
made a series of derisive statements directed at Fisher. Id. at 337. Fisher then ordered that
Bradley's name be stricken from the roll of attorneys permitted to practice before the Supreme
Court of the District of Columbia. Id. Bradley brought suit against the defendant-judge to re-
cover damages sustained "by reason of the wilful, malicious, oppressive and tyrannical acts and
conduct" of the defendant, whereby the plaintiff was deprived of his right to practice as an
attorney in that court. Id. at 336.
54. See id. at 347 (citing Floyd v. Baker, 77 Eng. Rep. 1305 (S.C. 1608)) (stating that a judge
may not, for things done by him as a judge, be questioned before another judge). For a general
discussion of judicial immunity, see Robert S. Catz & Jill J. Lange, Judicial Privilege, 22 GA. L.
REv. 89 (1987); Van Vechten Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation: Judicial Proceedings,
(Part I), 9 COLUM. L. REv. 463 (1909).
55. Phillip J. Roth, The Dangerous Erosion of Judicial Immunity, 18 BRIEF 26, 26 (1989).
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As with judges, statements made by those participating in a judicial
proceeding are absolutely privileged. 56 Therefore, statements by
court officers, attorneys, parties, witnesses, and jurors cannot serve as
the basis for a defamation action.57 Such statements are absolutely
privileged if related or pertinent to the matter before the court.58
56. Early English cases established broad protection for statements and writings made as a
part of judicial proceedings. See Henderson v. Broomhead, 157 Eng. Rep. 964 (Ex. 1859) (hold-
ing no action lies in a case against a party who makes an affidavit in support of a summons that is
scandalous, false and malicious); Rex v. Skinner, 98 Eng. Rep. 529, 530 (K.B. 1772) ("[N]either
party, witness, counsel, jury or Judge, can be put to answer, civilly or criminally, for words spo-
ken in office."); Anfield v. Feverhill, 80 Eng. Rep. 1113 (K.B. 1614) (stating no action lies against
one for bringing an action against another in the ordinary course of justice); Cutler v. Dixon, 76
Eng. Rep. 886 (K.B. 1585) (stating allegation in articles of peace exhibited to justices not action-
able); see also Paul T. Hayden, Reconsidering the Litigator's Absolute Privilege To Defame, 54
OHIO ST. L.J. 985, 1017-18 (1993) (discussing the English case law and its adoption in the United
States). The English courts have established the principle that "no action of slander or libel lies,
whether against judges, counsel, witnesses, or parties, for words written or spoken in the ordi-
nary course of any proceeding before any court or tribunal recognized by law." Dawkins v. Lord
Rokeby, 8 L.R.-Q.B. 255, 263 (1875). See generally PETER F. CARTER-RucK ET AL., CARTER-
RUCK ON LIBEL AND SLANDER 120-22 (4th ed. 1992) (discussing the absolute privilege for state-
ments made in judicial proceedings).
57. Because the need for participants to speak freely during judicial proceedings is so essential
to the judicial process, the individual's right to redress for defamation is necessarily curtailed.
McDermott v. Hughley, 561 A.2d 1038 (Md. 1989); see also Miner v. Novotny, 498 A.2d 269
(Md. 1985) (holding that a citizen's police brutality complaint was protected by a qualified privi-
lege); Keys v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 494 A.2d 200 (Md. 1985) (holding that creditor and its
attorney's statements uttered in course of judicial proceeding to garnish a debtor's wages were
absolutely privileged). Illinois courts also have accorded an absolute privilege to statements
made by participants in judicial proceedings. In Illinois Traffic Court Driver Improvement Educ.
Found. v. Peoria Journal Star, Inc., 494 N.E.2d 939 (II1. App. Ct. 1978), the court held that an
absolute privilege extended even to the administrative aspects of a judge's normal judicial func-
tion. Id. at 941-42. In Illinois, the privilege further extends to parties and witnesses who testify
in a case. Anderson v. Matz, 384 N.E.2d 759 (I11. App. Ct. 1986). In addition, the absolute
privilege attaches to the contents of a complaint so long as the court has colorable jurisdiction.
See, e.g., Defend v. Lascelles, 500 N.E.2d 712 (I11. App. Ct. 1986) (holding that pleading in a civil
cause of action for violation of applicable RICO provision is absolutely privileged from claim for
defamation so long as it has some relation to the matter in controversy provided that the trial
court had at least color of jurisdiction over plaintiff's civil RICO claim); Talley v. Alton Box Bd.
Co., 185 N.E.2d 349 (Ill. App. Ct. 1962) (holding comments on the conduct of an attorney in
performing the services for which he is seeking fees are absolutely privileged in judicial proceed-
ings to determine the propriety of awarding attorneys fees). Illinois courts have also found that
statements made by an attorney in a judicial proceeding are privileged so long as the attorney's
remarks have any bearing at all on the subject of the litigation. Weiler v. Stern, 384 N.E.2d 762
(Ill. App. Ct. 1978). Even letters written by the attorney come within the absolute privilege if
they are related in some way to the litigation. Id. at 764-65.
58. See generally McCutcheon v. Moran, 425 N.E.2d 1130, 1133 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) ("It has
long been the recognized rule of law that whatever is said or written in a legal proceeding which
is pertinent and material to the matters in controversy is privileged and no action of slander or
libel can be maintained upon it."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 585-89 (1981) (dis-
cussing absolute privilege as it applies to judicial officers, attorneys, parties to judicial proceed-
ings, witnesses, and jurors); see also Surace v. Wuliger, 495 N.E.2d 939, 942-43 (Ohio 1986)
(holding that "a claim alleging that a defamatory statement was made in a written pleading does
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The absolute privilege encompasses the legal process as well. State-
ments in pleadings and briefs are absolutely privileged, as are oral
statements made to the judge and jury while representing a client in
the course of litigation.5 9 Pre-trial procedures including depositions
and pre-trial conferences also enjoy the protection of absolute privi-
lege.60 Absolute privilege has been significantly expanded and is no
longer limited to formal pleadings and in-court communications, but
includes any communication pertinent to pending litigation.61
Absolute privilege thus affords protection to any judicial proceed-
ing, including statements made within the courtroom itself and plead-
ings and briefs. Such privilege has attached to judicial proceedings
and to those participating in the legal process as a result of society's
desire to assure free and open communication in the pursuit of equity
and justice. While American courts uniformly have recognized an ab-
solute privilege in traditional judicial proceedings, they have some-
times been reluctant to accord the same status to arbitration and
related dispute resolution procedures.62
not state a cause of action where the ... statement bears some reasonable relation to the judicial
proceeding").
The requirement that statements made in a judicial proceeding be pertinent or relevant
is not applied in a strict sense. When it is applied and questions are raised, all doubts
are resolved in favor of relevancy or pertinency. Although a party may not introduce
into a judicial proceeding inflammatory matters entirely unrelated to the litigation, he
is not answerable for those volunteered or included in his pleadings if they have any
bearing on the subject at issue.
Macie v. Clark Equip. Co., 290 N.E.2d 912, 914 (II. App. Ct. 1972) (citations omitted).
59. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 586 cmt. a (1977) ("The institution of a
judicial proceeding includes all pleadings and affidavits . . .[and] the examination and cross-
examination of witnesses, comments upon the evidence and arguments both oral and written
upon the evidence, whether made to a court or jury."); see also Justice v. Mowery, 430 N.E.2d
960, 962 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980) ("The great weight of authority is that attorneys conducting judi-
cial proceedings are privileged from prosecution from libel and slander in respect to words or
writings used in the course of such proceedings .... ).
60. See generally ROBERT D. SACK, LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS § 7.2.1.3, at
416 (Robert D. Sack & Sandra S. Baron eds., 2d ed. 1994) (discussing the absolute immunity
given attorneys).
61. See, e.g., Izzi v. Rellas, 163 Cal. Rptr. 689, 692 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (applying privilege to
letter to opposing counsel regarding default judgment as "proceedings which have the real po-
tential for becoming a court concern"); Richards v. Conklin, 575 P.2d 588 (Nev. 1978) (holding
letter to potential defendant in legal malpractice action privileged); Simmons v. Climaco, 507
N.E.2d 465 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986) (holding letters to supervisors of agents investigating client
privileged). But see Smith v. Suburban Restaurants, Inc., 373 N.E.2d 215, 218 (Mass. 1978) (re-
jecting privilege because there was "no indication that the attorney seriously contemplated a
judicial proceeding in good faith").
62. See William. J. Andrle, Jr., Extension of Absolute Privilege to Defamation in Arbitration
Proceedings-Sturdivant v. Seaboard Service System, Inc., 33 CATH. U. L. REv. 1073, 1079
(1984) (analyzing the broadening scope of absolute privilege and its effect on arbitration in the
District of Columbia). In Great Britain there was early consideration of extending an absolute
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B. Absolute Privilege and Labor Dispute Resolution Procedures
In 1966, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
decided General Motors Corp. v. Mendicki,63 the case most often cited
for the proposition that statements made incident to grievance resolu-
tion are absolutely privileged.64 The court based its decision on the
important federal interest in the peaceful settlement of industrial dis-
putes through arbitration. 65
or qualified privilege to arbitral proceedings. See CARTER-RUCK ET AL., supra note 56, at 121
(providing early analysis of extending the privilege in arbitral proceedings in Great Britain). The
Scottish case of Neill v. Henderson 8 S.L.T. 377 (1901) addressed this issue. The defamation
action in this case arose following an arbitration proceeding during which Neill, a witness, made
an alleged defamatory statement to the arbitrator about Henderson, the other party to the dis-
pute. Id. at 377. Lord Trayner, for the court, wrote "the language in question was used in the
course of a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, and was not plainly irrelevant or impertinent to
the matter being discussed, [therefore] I think [Neill] was privileged, at least to the extent of
requiring that malice should be put in issue .. " Id. Later, in Slack v. Barr 1 S.L.T. 133 (1918),
Lord Anderson of the Scottish Outer House revisited the privilege issue and the extension of an
absolute privilege to defamatory statements made during the course of arbitration proceedings.
Id. at 135-36. Lord Anderson based his decision on the well-recognized rule of law in Scotland
that the application of absolute privilege is based on considerations of public policy. Id. at 135.
He wrote, "I am unable to see why these [considerations] should not apply to all occasions on
which evidence is given for public purposes before any public body, whether that body is purely
judicial or quasi-judicial, or exists merely for administrative purposes." Id. at 136. Lord Ander-
son concluded that the alleged defamatory statement was absolutely privileged because the
statement was made before an "arbitration tribunal" in the course of an inquiry as to the admin-
istration of the law. Id. In England, in Tadd v. Eastwood, 12 Indus. Rel. L. Rep. 320 (1983),
Justice Hirst expressed the view that certain forms of arbitration are sufficiently comparable to
court proceedings and should, therefore, be absolutely privileged. Id. at 324-26. Justice Hirst
commented:
many arbitrations, particularly those in the commercial and maritime field, determine
finally issues identical to those decided in a court of law, and are presided over and
conducted in a manner virtually indistinguishable from court proceeding, apart from
the fact that they are held in private; this last factor should not in itself ... lend to a
conclusion adverse to the existence of absolute privilege....
Id. at 326. One English commentator on the law of libel and slander also suggests that
in an age in which commercial arbitrations involving huge sums of money are fre-
quently conducted by lawyers of great eminence, including many retired judges, with a
high degree of legal formality and sophistication, it is submitted that it would be appro-
priate for statutory reform to bestow absolute privilege on most forms of arbitration to
which the English Arbitration Act of 1950 applies.
CARTER-RUCK ET AL., supra note 56, at 12.
63. 367 F.2d 66 (10th Cir. 1966); see Donald W. Bostwick, Comment, The Availability of Defa-
mation Remedies for Statements Made During the Course of Labor Grievance-Arbitration Pro-
ceedings, 15 KAN. L. REV. 553 (1967) (providing an early discussion of Mendicki); see also Gary
D. Spivey, Annotation, Libel and Slander: Privileged Nature of Communications Made in the
Course of Grievance or Arbitration Procedure Provided for by Collective Bargaining Agreement,
60 A.L.R.3d 1041 (1974) (providing a general survey of the law relating to privilege).
64. Mendicki, 367 F.2d at 70-71.
65. Id.
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The labor policy favoring arbitration is found primarily in two fed-
eral statutes, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 66 including
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), and
the Railway Labor Act (RLA).67 These statutes affect workplace def-
amation actions in at least two ways. The NLRA encourages and the
RLA mandates resolution of disputes through arbitration proce-
dures.68 These very procedures simultaneously provide the opportu-
nity for defamatory utterances and a means to foreclose defamation
claims based upon federal preemption and absolute privilege.
1. The Absolute Privilege and the National Labor Relations Act
In Mendicki, the employee brought a defamation action based upon
statements made by his employer at a meeting between union and
company representatives to resolve a grievance he had filed following
his discharge for theft.69 The jury found in Mendicki's favor, and
General Motors appealed. 70
The Tenth Circuit reversed and entered a final judgment for Gen-
eral Motors, finding the statements protected by an absolute privi-
lege. 71 It reasoned that permitting employees to resort to defamation
claims would unduly burden the federal interest in the peaceful settle-
ment of industrial disputes and impair national labor policy.72 The
federal interest required a complete shield against liability.73 The
Mendicki court acknowledged that in Linn v. United Plant Guard
Workers of America,74 the Supreme Court had found that federal law
only imposed additional requirements on state defamation law in the
context of a labor dispute.75 Nevertheless, the court found that the
66. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994). When referred to in this article, the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (NLRA) is understood to include the Wagner Act of 1935, the Taft-Hartley Act of
1947 (Labor Management Relations Act or LMRA) and the Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959. Ref-
erences to the individual statutes will be made when necessary for clarity. See ROBERT A.
GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 1-6
(1976) (providing a concise history of the National Labor Relations Act).
67. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1982).
68. Compare the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 171(a) with the RLA, 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (i).
69. 367 F.2d 66 (10th Cir. 1966).
70. Id. at 67.
71. Id. at 70.
72. Id. at 70-71. The Court recognized that "[tihe declared policy of the national legislature
on labor relations is to encourage, facilitate and effectuate the settlement of issues between
employers and employees through the 'processes of conference and collective bargaining be-
tween employers and representatives of their employees,' in order to promote and preserve in-
dustrial peace." Id. at 70 (citation omitted).
73. Id. at 70-72.
74. 383 U.S. 53 (1966).
75. Mendicki, 367 F.2d at 71-72.
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additional concern of peaceful dispute resolution justified the imposi-
tion of an absolute privilege. 76
Many courts have followed the reasoning and holding in Mendicki
and have further developed and shaped the limits of the absolute priv-
ilege. 77 In Brooks v. Solomon Co.,78 the district court found alleged
slanderous statements made during an informal union-management
grievance meeting absolutely privileged. 79 Relying upon Mendicki,
the court held that the statements were made during a proceeding en-
couraged by federal law to peacefully resolve grievances.80
In Watts v. Grand Union Co.,81 the district court extended an abso-
lute privilege to statements made at a meeting called by management
to discuss possible discrepancies in an employee's cash register re-
ports. 82 The issue before the court was whether the allegedly slander-
ous statements were made during a conference to adjust a grievance
or for other peaceful disposition of a dispute covered by a collective
agreement, as required by Mendicki.83 The court concluded that be-
cause the meeting was called "for the purpose of disposing of 'differ-
ences, disputes, or complaints' and was conducted in an attempt to
settle disputes" pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement, the
statements were unqualifiedly privileged.84
In Honaker v. Florida Power & Light Co.,85 the court also extended
an absolute privilege to statements made in an informal grievance
conference preceding the filing of a formal grievance.86 In that case, a
company manager called an employee to his office to determine if the
76. Id. at 72.
77. See, e.g., Wallin v. Vienna Sausage Mfg., 203 Cal. Rptr. 375 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (holding
statements made by parties and witnesses during the course of grievance procedure hearings
established by collective bargaining agreements absolutely privileged against claims of defama-
tion); Sturdivant v. Seaboard Serv. Sys., Ltd., 459 A.2d 1058 (D.C. App. 1983) (holding that
statements made by a witness in an arbitration proceeding arising from the discharge of a cashier
based on the violation report filed by the witness was absolutely privileged); Rougeau v. Fire-
stone Tire & Rubber Co., 274 So. 2d 454 (La. Ct. App. 1973) (holding that statements made by
an employer during an investigation of theft of employer's lawnmower "enjoyed an unqualified
privilege"); Neece v. Kantu, 507 P.2d 447 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 507 P.2d 443 (N.M. 1973)
(holding that absolute privilege applied to defamatory remarks made during course of labor
grievance proceedings).
78. 542 F. Supp. 1229 (N.D. Ala. 1982).
79. Id. at 1234.
80. Id. at 1233-34. The Court cited 29 U.S.C. § 171(a) as the source of this federal policy. Id.
at 1234.
81. 114 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3158 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
82. Id. at 3160.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 3161.
85. 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3265 (M.D. Fla. 1977).
86. Id. at 3270-71.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
employee falsified his application for employment by failing to dis-
close that one of his relatives worked for the company.87 Upon learn-
ing that a relative did work for the company, the manager summoned
the union steward to his office and accused the employee of falsifying
his application, requested the employee's resignation and when the
employee refused to resign, terminated his employment. 88
The district court noted that the manager's statements were made at
an informal meeting preceding the filing of a formal grievance and
that such a meeting was specifically provided for in the labor contract
between the company and the union.89 Relying upon the public policy
rationale established in Mendicki, the court found the statements ab-
solutely privileged. 90
Courts have also expanded the scope of the absolute privilege
adopted in Mendicki to disciplinary action notices when the collective
bargaining agreement requires them. In Hasten v. Phillips Petroleum
Co.,9 the Tenth Circuit found that an absolute privilege was not lim-
ited to statements made during oral grievance proceedings, but ex-
tended to "the entire proceeding contemplated by the provisions of
the agreement for the grievance machinery." 92 The court held that
this included a written discharge notice as long as the statements in
the notice were not published to "persons without a legitimate job-
related interest in receiving [them]. '93 The court reasoned that "fed-
eral policy encouraging collective bargaining and frankness in labor
disputes applies to termination notices as well as to bargaining
sessions. '94
Similarly, in Joftes v. Kaufman,95 the court found statements con-
tained in three different letters of dismissal to the plaintiff absolutely
privileged.96 Premised upon Mendicki and national labor policy, the
court held that because the notices were "contemplated by the collec-
tive bargaining agreement" and were published only to those individu-
87. Id. at 3266-67.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 3270. Interestingly, the Court noted that "even if under federal law no absolute
privilege exists.., under both federal and Florida law the statements are qualifiedly privileged
in the absence of express malice on the part of the defendant." Id. at 3271.
91. 640 F.2d 274 (10th Cir. 1981).
92. Id. at 277.
93. Id. at 279 (quoting Joftes v. Kaufman, 324 F.Supp. 660, 664 (D.D.C. 1971)).
94. Id. at 276; see also Rougeau v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 274 So. 2d 454 (La. Ct. App.
1973) (denying employee's right to recover on defamation charges when investigation of em-
ployee's actions focused on theft occurring during employee's shift).
95. 324 F. Supp. 660 (D.D.C. 1971).
96. Id. at 663.
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als having a legitimate job-related interest in the matter, they were
unqualifiedly privileged.97
Some courts specifically have held that statements made in connec-
tion with grievance procedures governed by Section 301 of the LMRA
are absolutely privileged. In Nelson v. Lapeyrouse Grain Corp.,98 a
discharged employee brought an action against his employer and
others, alleging that statements made during a grievance hearing fol-
lowing his discharge were slanderous. 99 The court first found that the
employee's defamation action was not preempted by Section 301 be-
cause it could be resolved without recourse to the collective bargain-
ing agreement. 00 The court, however, found that an overriding
federal labor policy mandates that statements "made during federally
recognized labor grievance hearings be absolutely privileged."' 0'1
In Patterson v. State of Alaska, Department of Agriculture,0 2 the
court found statements made in a letter to the union absolutely privi-
leged even though the collective bargaining agreement was not yet in
effect. 10 3 In Patterson, an employee brought an action against his em-
ployer for making defamatory statements in a letter to the union con-
cerning the employee's misconduct. 1°4 The court upheld summary
judgment for the employer. 105 It reasoned that statements made dur-
ing the course of grievance proceedings conducted pursuant to the
provisions of a collective bargaining agreement, subject to Section
301, were absolutely privileged. 0 6
Although the collective bargaining agreement containing the griev-
ance procedures was not in force when the letter was sent, the court
held that the letter was sent pursuant to an "employer implemented
97. Id. at 662-64. In distinguishing Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of Am., 383 U.S. 53
(1966), the Court declared:
Here, on the other hand, Joftes had available to him an opportunity through the griev-
ance machinery to secure personal relief and vindication .... To allow him to proceed
instead by way of a burdensome, expensive, vexatious libel suit against individuals who
did no more than fulfill their duty to inform him of reasons for his discharge would
indeed be subversive of the carefully constructed system of procedures and remedies
for employment disputes.
Id. at 664.
98. 534 So. 2d 1085 (Ala. 1988).
99. Id. at 1089.
100. Id. at 1090-91; see infra part IV.A (discussing preemption of workplace defamation
actions).
101. Nelson, 534 So. 2d at 1092.
102. 880 P.2d 1038 (Alaska 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 936 (1995).
103. Id. at 1047.
104. Id. at 1040.
105. Id. at 1047.
106. Id.
1996]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
last offer agreement" which was a "substitute for a collective bargain-
ing agreement.' 10 7 Thus, "[the letter's] relationship with the griev-
ance resolution process brought it within the scope of an absolute
privilege." 108
Courts have also found statements made by legal counsel and arbi-
trators in the course of a grievance procedure absolutely privileged.
In Kaminski v. Roadway Express, Inc., 09 the district court found
statements made by the company's legal counsel during an arbitration
hearing absolutely privileged because the hearing was quasi-judi-
cial." 0 The court explained that because the attorney's statements
"were merely part of a cross-examination of Plaintiff in a quasi-judi-
cial proceeding," they were absolutely privileged and not
actionable."'
Not all courts have agreed that federal labor law or policy requires
an absolute privilege for statements made in the course of arbitration
and related dispute resolution procedures. In Thompson v. Public
Service Company of Colorado,"2 an employee brought a defamation
action against his employer arising from statements made by the em-
ployer in two disciplinary notices."13 The trial court granted summary
judgment for the defendant, finding that the employer's statements
were protected by a qualified privilege under state law." 4 The court
of appeals affirmed on other grounds, finding the statements abso-
lutely privileged under Section 301 of the LMRA." 5
The Supreme Court of Colorado found that both the trial court and
the court of appeals had erred and reversed the grant of judgment to
the employer." 6 The court first held that Section 301 of the LMRA
did not preempt the state law defamation claim, since resolution of
107. Id.
108. Id.; see also Hyles v. Mensing, 849 F.2d 1213 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that the need to
protect the collective bargaining agreement rendered statements made in the grievance process
privileged).
109. No. 94-C4425, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2475 (N.D. 11. Mar. 1, 1995).
110. Id. at *16-17.
111. Id. at *18; see also Stiles v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 624 N.E.2d 238 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993)
(finding an absolute privilege under the NLRA for allegedly defamatory statements made in
connection with an investigation of a grievance held pursuant to the collective bargaining agree-
ment). Citing the Restatement, the Court further recognized that" '[g]rievance proceedings have
also been classified as quasi-judicial, thereby giving rise to an absolute privilege for statements
made by a party concerning another if the matter has some relationship to the proceeding.'" Id.
at 242 (quoting the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 587 (1977)).
112. 800 P.2d 1299 (Colo. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 973 (1991).
113. Id. at 1300.
114. Id. at 1301.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1307.
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the claim did not require an interpretation of the collective bargaining
agreement. 117 Relying upon Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of
America,118 the court then held that a qualified privilege sufficed to
safeguard the interests of national labor policy. 119 The court viewed
the federal interest in free debate that was considered in Linn similar
to the "federal interest in encouraging frank discussion in the context
of a grievance proceeding or a disciplinary action," and thus con-
cluded that there was no basis for affording an absolute privilege to
the disciplinary notice statements. 120
In Ezekiel v. Jones Motor Co.,121 an employee brought a defamation
action against his former employer and a co-employee for statements
the co-employee made before a joint management-union grievance
board alleging that the plaintiff stole a rod and reel from the em-
ployer. 22 The trial court entered a judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict for the defendants on the grounds that the alleged slanderous
statements were absolutely privileged. 23 The Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts held that the defendants enjoyed only a qualified
privilege in revealing the grounds for the employee's termination to
the grievance board. 24
117. Id. at 1305; see Thompson v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., 773 P.2d 1103 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988);
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 7 n.3 and Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4 n.2,
Thompson v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., 800 P.2d 1299 (Colo. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 773
(1991) (noting that while the collective bargaining agreement did not contain an express require-
ment that the employer send a written disciplinary notice, the company that maintained the
disciplinary notices were required by past practice).
118. 383 U.S. 53 (1966).
119. Thompson, 800 P.2d at 1306.
120. Id. In responding to the Public Service Company of Colorado's Petition for Writ of Cer-
tiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Solicitor General, representing the United States as Ami-
cus Curiae, stated:
We recognize that some confusion exists in lower court decisions concerning the source
and scope of privileges applicable to statements made during grievance hearings, arbi-
tration, and other procedures pursuant to collective bargaining agreements. Greater
clarity in this broad area is plainly desirable. But none of those decisions has concluded
that federal labor law absolutely bars a defamation action where, as here, the claim is
based upon statements that are not part of the process prescribed by a labor contract,
and where the claim can be resolved without interpretation of the collective bargaining
agreement. Accordingly, we do not believe that review of this case is likely to provide
the Court with the appropriate vehicle for resolving the issue that divides some of the
lower courts: whether statements made in accordance with grievance procedures estab-
lished by a collective bargaining agreement are absolutely privileged under federal la-
bor law.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 8-9, Thompson.
121. 372 N.E.2d 1281 (Mass. 1978).
122. Id. at 1283.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1284.
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The court rejected the argument that the grievance procedure was a
quasi-judicial proceeding requiring an absolute privilege because "[a]
witness at the grievance hearing need not give sworn testimony, nor is
he subject to the control of a judge to limit his testimony to compe-
tent, relevant and material evidence."'1 25 The court concluded that a
conditional privilege provided a "sufficient incentive for the witness to
speak openly," but did not "remove the safeguards against communi-
cations which are deliberately false."'1 26
2. The Absolute Privilege Under the Railway Labor Act
Shortly after the Mendicki court recognized an absolute privilege
for statements made pursuant to a grievance procedure, courts began
adopting an unqualified privilege for statements made as a part of dis-
pute resolution proceedings governed by the RLA. 127 The RLA 128
requires the submission of disputes between carriers and their workers
"growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application
of [collective bargaining agreements]" to special resolution mecha-
nisms. 129 Grievances growing out of the interpretation or application
of collective bargaining agreements are termed "minor disputes"
under the RLA.130 The resolution of minor disputes is within the ex-
clusive jurisdiction of the National Railroad Adjustment Board
(NRAB) and public law boards. 13'
125. Id. at 1285.
126. Id.; see also Fisher v. Illinois Office Supply Co., 474 N.E.2d 1263 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984)
(holding that statements made during grievance hearings received only traditional privilege, not
absolute privilege).
127. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1988). The Railway Labor Act covers employees of railways and
airlines. 45 U.S.C. § 151 (First), 181 (1988). The absolute privilege for statements made at pro-
ceedings pursuant to the RLA also apply to statements made in a labor grievance. See Bell v.
Gellert, 469 So. 2d 141 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (finding allegedly defamatory statements, con-
tained in a labor grievance, were absolutely privileged).
128. 45 U.S.C. § 181.
129. 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (i); Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Sheehan, 439 U.S. 89 (1978); Andrews
v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 406 U.S. 320 (1972).
130. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives Assoc., 491 U.S. 299, 303-04
(1989); Andrews, 406 U.S. at 322.
131. A public law board is a tribunal established by railroads and labor organizations, having
co-equal jurisdiction with the National Railroad Adjustment Board to decide disputes. 45
U.S.C. § 153 Second; O'Neill v. Pub. Law Bd. No. 550, 581 F.2d 692, 694-95 (7th Cir. 1978). A
minor dispute is first handled through the railroad's normal internal dispute resolution mecha-
nisms. 45 U.S.C. § 152 First. An "investigation" or hearing is typically held on the railroad's
property and conducted by railroad officials. 45 U.S.C. § 152 Sixth. The conduct of the investi-
gation is governed by the applicable labor agreement. 45 U.S.C. § 152 Eighth. If the dispute is
unresolved, a party may submit it to the NRAB or to a public law board. 45 U.S.C. § 157 First.
The public law board is composed of a labor member, a railroad member, and a neutral and is an
arbitral body which reviews the result of the investigation hearing to insure it conforms to the
labor agreement. See Kulavic v. Chicago & 111. Midland Ry. Co., 1 F.3d 507, 512-17 (7th Cir.
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Courts based their decisions on the privilege issue primarily upon
the strong interest in amicable dispute resolution and the quasi-judi-
cial nature of the RLA proceedings. Macy v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc.132 is a commonly cited opinion for conferring an absolute privi-
lege on statements made during grievance resolution under the RLA.
In Macy, Trans World Airlines discharged the employee for sabotage
in the presence of a union steward. 133 The airline, pursuant to the
labor agreement, gave the union notice of the discharge and held a
hearing in which the discharge was upheld.134
The court first found that the statements to the union were quali-
fiedly privileged under state law because Maryland protected em-
ployer-employee communications regarding employment.135 It then
held that the RLA provides an absolute privilege because of the na-
tional policy favoring statutory and contractual dispute resolution
mechanisms. 136
Other courts have found that an absolute privilege exists for termi-
nation notices sent pursuant to the requirements of the RLA. In
Urdahl v. Eastern Airlines Inc. ,137 an airline employee brought an ac-
tion for libel and slander against the airline and one of its supervisors
following her dismissal for misappropriating company funds. 138 The
employee had previously grieved the discipline and a hearing officer
had affirmed the discharge. 39 The employee then appealed to the
System Board of Adjustment pursuant to the RLA.140 The System
Board ruled that the evidence failed to establish that the employee
was guilty of misappropriating company funds.' 4' The Board directed
1993); Elmore v. Chicago & Ill. Midland Ry. Co., 782 F.2d 94. 95 (7th Cir. 1986); see also FRANK
ELKOURI & EDNA ASPEN ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 146-151, 304 (4th ed. 1985)
(discussing arbitration under the Railway Labor Act). An NRAB or public law board award
may be reviewed by the federal district court. 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (q).
132. 381 F. Supp. 142 (D. Md. 1974).
133. Id. at 144-45.
134. Id. at 145.
135. Id. at 146.
136. Id. at 148.
137. 114 Lab. Cas. (CCH) $ 11,990, at 28,506 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
138. Id. at 28,507.
139. Id.
140. Id. The Railway Labor Act requires airlines to establish System Boards of Adjustment
to arbitrate disputes between employees and carriers growing out of grievances. Id. at 28,507 n.4
(citing 45 U.S.C. § 184). Airline boards of adjustment are treated in the same manner as railroad
boards of adjustment by the RLA. See Hunt v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 600 F.2d 176 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 946 (1979); see also ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 131, at 151 (reviewing
the Railway Labor Act's mandates to create special boards of adjustment to resolve disputes).
141. 114 Lab. Cas. (CCH) at 28,507.
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the airline to reinstate the employee with full backpay and seniority
and to remove the termination letter from her file. 142
After the System Board ruling, the employee instituted the defama-
tion action alleging that her termination letter setting forth the rea-
sons for her discharge was libelous.143 The court found the statements
absolutely privileged on the grounds that "candid explanations of the
basis for an employee's discharge are necessary to further important
federal labor policies."'144
Courts have also found communications made in proceedings under
the RLA absolutely privileged because those proceedings are "quasi-
judicial" in nature. In Mock v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Rail-
road Co.,145 the railroad discharged a conductor for violating one of
its rules.146 The employee filed a petition for reinstatement and back
wages with the NRAB. 147
The railroad replied to the petition, stating that the employee had
been dismissed for a violation of company rules when he fraudulently
submitted a claim for an on-the-job injury which had not occurred. 48
The employee sued for defamation based upon the allegation of dis-
honesty contained in the railroad's reply.' 49
The court found the company's reply absolutely privileged because
"like the privilege which is generally applied to pertinent statements
made in formal judicial proceedings, an absolute privilege also at-
taches to relevant statements made during administrative proceedings
which are 'quasi-judicial' in nature.' 50 The court noted that because
Congress created the procedural framework of the NRAB for the res-
olution of "minor disputes," Congress "provided it with the attributes
of a 'quasi-judicial' body.' 51
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 28,509. Section 27 of the flight attendants' labor agreement required written notifi-
cation before any disciplinary action could be taken against an employee. Id.
145. 454 F.2d 131 (8th Cir. 1972).
146. Id. at 132.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 133. The court defined a "quasi-judicial" proceeding as one where the "function of
the administrative body under consideration involves the exercise of discretion in the application
of legal principles to varying factual situations and requires notice and hearing." Id. at 134. The
court then noted that the purpose of the NRAB is to function as a body to settle grievances
arising in the railroad industry. Id.; see also Stepanischen v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Corp.,
722 F.2d 922, 932 (1st Cir. 1983) (holding employer's responsive pleading to employee's claim for
wrongful discharge filed with the NRAB was "absolutely privileged as the writing of an attorney
during the course of an adjudicative proceeding").
151. Mock, 454 F.2d at 134.
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In Kloch v. Ratcliffe,152 the court found statements made by a rail-
road foreman at an investigation hearing held pursuant to the RLA
absolutely privileged. 153 The court held that the statements concern-
ing an engineer's alleged falsification of his time log were made at "an
arbitration proceeding which is similar to a judicial or quasi-judicial
proceeding."1 54
In Neece v. Kantu,15 5 the court extended the definition of a quasi-
judicial proceeding to a discharge notice sent following a grievance
proceeding. 56 The airline employee involved was discharged for
stealing company property.157 Subsequently, a grievance proceeding
was held pursuant to the labor contract where the hearing officer up-
held the employee's discharge.158 The hearing officer, an airline em-
ployee, then sent a letter to the employee confirming his decision to
uphold the employee's discharge for "unauthorized possession of
company property.' 59
The employee brought an action for defamation against the hearing
officer based upon the confirmation letter. 60 The court upheld the
trial court's grant of summary judgment to the company finding the
grievance hearing a "quasi-judicial proceeding" and the letter, follow-
ing that proceeding, absolutely privileged.' 6'
C. The Absolute Privilege and Non-Labor Arbitrations
The application of an absolute privilege to non-labor related arbi-
trations has not resulted in a wealth of case law. Nevertheless, some
jurisdictions have provided the framework for the extension of abso-
lute privilege to the non-labor arbitration setting.
In Corbin v. Washington Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 62 a South
Carolina federal district court recognized an absolute privilege in a
defamation action arising from testimony and argument presented in
152. 375 N.W.2d 916 (Neb. 1985).
153. Id. at 919.
154. Id.
155. 507 P.2d 447 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 507 P.2d 443 (N.M. 1973).
156. Id. at 453.
157. Id. at 449.
158. Id. at 451. The hearing was the second step in a procedure for adjudication of grievances
provided for by the collective bargaining agreement and ultimately led to a hearing before the
Systems Board of Adjudication pursuant to the RLA. Id. at 453.
159. Id. at 451.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 453; see also Barchers v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 669 S.W.2d 235 (Mo. Ct. App.
1984) (finding that absolute privilege applies to statements made before public law boards be-
cause of their quasi-judicial nature).
162. 278 F. Supp. 393 (D.S.C.), aff'd, 398 F.2d 543 (4th Cir. 1968).
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an arbitration proceeding involving two insurance groups.163 The at-
torney representing one of the insurance groups, which was charged
with failure to protect the other insurance group's subrogation rights,
sued, asserting that a statement submitted to the board of arbitrators
which referred to him as "false in one thing false in all things" de-
famed his character as an attorney and as an adjuster.164
The district court found the defamation claim barred on the
grounds that the arbitration proceeding was quasi-judicial in character
and function. 165 The court recognized the scope of the absolute privi-
lege as extending to all "indispensable" proceedings. 166 It concluded
that where "the parties cannot argue their cause or offer testimony
before the arbitrators without threat of harassment via libel actions,
arbitration becomes a farce and the many expressions of judicial and
legislative encouragement of arbitration a snare. 1 67
The Maryland Court of Appeals extended the scope of absolute
privilege to include the testimony of a physician retained as an expert
witness in a health claims arbitration proceeding in Odyniec v. Schnei-
der.168 Pursuant to Maryland statute, medical malpractice claims are
initially submitted to the Health Claims Arbitration Office for assess-
ment of liability and damages before the complainant may resort to
the Maryland courts.169
The complainant retained Dr. Schneider to render an opinion as to
whether Dr. Odyniec had committed malpractice. 170 Dr. Odyniec
filed a defamation action against Dr. Schneider based upon the state-
ments made by Dr. Schneider during the course of his evaluation and
examination of the complainant. 171 Dr. Schneider moved to dismiss
163. Id. at 400.
164. Id. at 395.
165. Id. at 398.
166. Id.
167. Id. The Court's reasoning broadens the scope of absolute privilege to something ap-
proaching the judicial model:
If... arbitration is to be safely utilized as an effective means of resolving controversy,
the absolute immunity attaching to its proceedings must extend beyond the arbitrators
themselves; it must extend to all 'indispensable' proceedings, such as the receipt of
evidence and argument thereon. To urge that the immunity should be limited to the
arbitrators would be similar to arguing that judicial immunity should go no farther than
the judge... . 'This rule reflects the prevailing common law view that the public inter-
est in freedom of expression by participants in judicial proceedings, uninhibited by any
risk of resultant suits for defamation, outweighs the interest of the individual in the
protection of his reputation from defamatory impairment in the judicial forum.'
Id. (citations omitted).
168. 588 A.2d 786 (Md. 1991).
169. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 3-2A-01 to -09 (1989).
170. Odyniec, 588 A.2d at 787.
171. Id.
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1996] EXPANDING THE ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE 701
the defamation claim based on his contention that the alleged defama-
tory comments were made during the course of a judicial proceeding
and were therefore absolutely privileged. 172
The Court of Appeals held that an absolute witness immunity
should be extended to any administrative proceeding, including health
claims arbitrations, provided that such proceedings were at least the
functional equivalent of a judicial proceeding. 173 The court equated
the health claims procedure to a judicial proceeding and concluded
that the "arbitration machinery established by the legislature for
health care malpractice cases falls well within the principle ... that in
appropriate cases, an absolute privilege in defamation actions will be
extended beyond the confines of purely judicial proceedings."'174 In
addition, the court recognized the strong public policy considerations
for the extension of an absolute privilege since the "social benefit de-
rived from free and candid participation by potential witnesses in the
arbitration process is essential to achieve the goal of a fair and just
resolution of claims of malpractice against health care providers."'1 75
More recently, in Moore v. Conliffe,176 the California Supreme
Court, in construing Section 47(b) of the Civil Code, held that an ex-
pert witness who testified at a deposition held in connection with a
private, contractual arbitration proceeding was immunized from tort
claims by virtue of the absolute privilege for statements made in a
judicial proceeding. 177 Although the plaintiff's complaint did not spe-
cifically allege defamation, it did present numerous other tort actions
which required the California Supreme Court to determine the appli-
cability of privilege.178
The supreme court noted that the purpose of the absolute or "litiga-
tion" privilege strongly supported its application to a witness who tes-
tified in the course of a private, contractual arbitration proceeding. 179
Such a proceeding, the court reasoned, was designed "to serve a func-
tion analogous to - and typically to eliminate the need to resort to -
the court system," and "the need for an absolute privilege to foster the
172. Id.
173. Id. at 792-93.
174. Id. at 792.
175. Id. at 793.
176. 871 P.2d 204 (Cal. 1994). California Civil Code Section 47(b) states in pertinent part: "A
privileged publication... is one made: In any.., judicial proceeding.... or in any other official
proceeding authorized by law .... CAL. CIV. CODE § 47 (West 1982 & Supp. 1994).
177. Moore, 871 P.2d at 205.
178. Id. at 207.
179. Id. at 209. The court recognized that the purpose of the litigation privilege is to en-
courage witnesses to testify completely, truthfully, and without fear of potential liability. Id. at
208.
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giving of complete and truthful testimony was a vital component in
the private contractual arbitration setting as it is in a traditional court-
room proceeding.' u80
The supreme court acknowledged that an absolute privilege not
only applies to court proceedings, but also to quasi-judicial proceed-
ings such as a private arbitration - the functional equivalent to a
court proceeding. 18' Thus, the expert witness' testimony at the arbi-
tration proceeding was absolutely privileged and could not serve as
the basis for a tort claim. 82
The continued reliance on alternative dispute resolution proce-
dures, including arbitration, will require courts to consider whether a
defamatory statement made in connection with such a procedure will
be afforded an absolute privilege. The recent trend has been to ex-
tend the absolute privilege to statements made during dispute resolu-
tion procedures that are functionally equivalent to judicial
proceedings. 183
The determination of whether a body is quasi-judicial depends upon
the powers and duties of the body conducting the proceedings and the
nature of the proceedings themselves.' 84 Traditionally, the characteri-
zation of a proceeding as quasi-judicial depended on the power to de-
termine legal rights and affect the status of those who appeared before
180. Id.
181. Id. at 210. The Court restricted its ruling to arbitrations by declaring: "We have no
occasion in this case to determine whether the litigation privilege applies to statements made in
the course of 'alternative dispute resolution' proceedings other than those involving arbitra-
tions." Id. at 214 n.8.
182. Id. at 209. But see Preiser v. Rosenzweig, 646 A.2d 1166 (Pa. 1994) (holding that absolute
privilege did not apply to alleged defamatory statement made in private arbitration proceeding
before Special Fee Determination Committee of the Allegheny County Bar Association). This
result is not inconsistent with Moore v. Conliffe, 871 P.2d 204 (Cal. 1994). See supra note 176
and accompanying text (discussing the Moore case).
183. See Richardson v. Dunbar, 419 N.E.2d 1205 (II1. App. Ct. 1981) (holding statements
made before a quasi-judicial proceeding are absolutely privileged, but that police committee of
city council is not a quasi-judicial body); Parker v. Kirkland, 18 N.E.2d 709 (I11. App. Ct. 1939)
(finding statements presented to Board of Appeals of Cook County regarding objections to
property tax assessments absolutely privileged); Allan & Allan Arts, Ltd. v. Rosenblum, 615
N.Y.S.2d 410, 412-13 (A.D. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 301 (1995) (according statements by
landowner at zoning board of appeals absolute privilege); see also Jones v. Mirgon, No. 88-7001,
1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 13197 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 31, 1989) (finding statement made in the course of
Federal Communications Commission lottery-licensing proceeding absolutely privileged); Allen
v. Ali, 435 N.E.2d 167 (I11. App. Ct. 1982) (stating that absolute privilege extended to quasi-
judicial proceeding which involved state supreme court's attorney disciplinary body). But see
Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross Inc., 834 F.Supp. 1023 (N.D. II1. 1993), aff'd, 28 F.3d 704
(7th Cir. 1994) (refusing to extend absolute privilege to statements made in termination notice of
employee due to purely administrative nature of such notice).
184. Richardson, 419 N.E.2d at 1208.
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the adjudicating body. 8 5 Illinois courts have identified six powers
which distinguish quasi-judicial bodies from those merely performing
administrative functions. 186 These powers include:
(1) [T]he power to exercise judgment and discretion;
(2) [T]he power to hear and determine or to ascertain facts and
decide;
(3) [T]he power to make binding orders and judgments;
(4) [T~he power to affect the personal or property rights of private
persons;
(5) [T]he power to examine witnesses, and to hear the litigation is-
sues on a hearing; and
(6) [T]he power to enforce decisions and impose penalties.'8 7
While not all of these powers need exist for a body to be considered
quasi-judicial in nature, the greater the number of powers present, the
more likely the body is, in fact, quasi-judicial and the more likely it is
a court will extend an absolute privilege to statements made during
such a proceeding.' 88 Clearly the overwhelming majority of arbitra-
tion proceedings meet this test. 8 9
IV. OTHER POTENTIAL DEFENSES TO CLAIMS ARISING FROM
DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEEDINGS
Aside from privilege, courts confronted with defamation claims
arising from arbitration proceedings have applied federal preemption
and collateral estoppel to foreclose litigation. The effectiveness of
those defenses will be analyzed in this segment of the Article.
A. Federal Preemption in Labor Arbitrations
Another source of protection for statements made in connection
with labor arbitrations is preemption based upon either Section 301 of
the LMRA 190 or the RLA.19' While some cases have used these stat-
185. Id.
186. Thomas v. Petrulis, 465 N.E.2d 1059, 1062 (I11. App. Ct. 1984) (citing with approval
Parker v. Holbrook, 647 S.W.2d 692, 695 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982) (applying absolute privilege to a
charge of discrimination filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission)).
187. Id.; see also Parrillo, Weiss & Moss v. Cashion, 537 N.E.2d 851, 854-55 (IlI. App. Ct.
1989) (reiterating the same six powers).
188. Thomas, 465 N.E.2d at 1062. In England, to fall within the protection of absolute privi-
lege the tribunal "must proceed in a manner that is similar to a court of justice ... its object must
be to arrive at a judicial and not an administrative determination, and ... it must be recognized
by law." Lincoln v. Daniels 1 Q.B. 237, 253 (1962).
189. See supra notes 145-82 and accompanying text (discussing cases where the privilege has
been applied in quasi-judicial situations).
190. 29 U.S.C. § 185.
191. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88.
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utes as bases for according an absolute privilege to such statements,192
the preemption analysis is distinct with separate standards and ratio-
nales. If preemption is found, the state claim is displaced by federal
law and the court may be deprived of jurisdiction altogether. 193 Abso-
lute privilege, conversely, is a defense to an otherwise valid claim. 194
1. The Labor Management Relations Act
Two United States Supreme Court decisions defined the parameters
of Section 301 preemption and established a test to determine when it
occurs. In Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck,195 the Supreme Court held
that Section 301 preempts state claims that are "inextricably inter-
twined" with the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. 196 The
Lueck court held an employee's action arising from the handling of his
claim for disability benefits preempted. 197 The Court reasoned that
evaluation of the dispute would necessarily require a review of the
collective bargaining agreement, the document establishing the em-
ployee's right to benefits. 98
Subsequently, in Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc.,199 the
Supreme Court recognized that federal law does not preempt claims
which are analytically independent of the collective bargaining agree-
ment.200 In Lingle, an employee brought an action claiming that his
employer violated an Illinois statute by discharging him in retaliation
for filing a workers compensation claim.20' The employee was cov-
ered by a collective bargaining agreement which required "just cause"
for his discharge.202 The Seventh Circuit had held the claim pre-
empted, reasoning that a discharge for filing a workers compensation
192. For a discussion of the absolute privilege in the RLA context, see supra notes 132-36 and
accompanying text (granting absolute privilege during grievance resolution); supra notes 137-44
and accompanying text (granting absolute privilege for termination notices); supra notes 145-51
(granting absolute privilege to quasi-judicial proceedings); supra notes 152-54 (granting absolute
privilege to statements made during an investigation). For a discussion of absolute privilege in
the LMRA context, see infra notes 195-217 and accompanying text.
193. See infra notes 195-217 and accompanying text (finding grounds for section 301
preemption).
194. See supra note 192.
195. 471 U.S. 202 (1985).
196. Id. at 213.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 218.
199. 486 U.S. 399 (1988).
200. Id. at 413.
201. Id. at 402.
202. Id. at 401.
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claim would not be for "cause" and the labor agreement would pro-
vide a remedy for the aggrieved employee. 20 3
The Supreme Court reversed,20 4 finding that although the agree-
ment might have provided a remedy, the claim was not preempted.20 5
According to the Court, the state law right not to be terminated for
filing a workers compensation claim was completely outside the col-
lective bargaining agreement, and the employee's claim, therefore, re-
quired no consideration of the terms of that agreement.2 °6
Whether Section 301 will preempt a defamation claim arising out of
a dispute resolution procedure, therefore, hinges on the collateral is-
sue (from an arbitration policy standpoint) of whether it requires con-
sideration of the terms of the labor agreement. 20 7 Hence, the
protection provided by preemption may be complete, but unpredict-
able, since the decisionmaker will focus on the claims' relation to the
labor contract rather than on the policy of protecting the viability of
dispute resolution procedures. This preemption analysis also fails to
take into account the economic and institutional cost of multiple pro-
cedures aimed at resolving the same or similar issues and of essentially
allowing participants to collaterally attack arbitral awards.
In Shane v. Greyhound Lines Inc.,208 the Ninth Circuit found that a
defamation claim arising from statements made during the course of
grievance resolution procedures was preempted.2°9 In Shane, the
claim was apparently premised on Notices of Intent to Discipline
which were required by the labor agreement.21 0 Applying the stan-
dards articulated in Lueck211 and Lingle,21 2 the Court held "[a]ny
claim based upon the discharge notification is . . . 'inextricably inter-
twined' with the [labor agreement]. '213 The Shane decision distin-
guished its facts from those in Tellez v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.21 4
203. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 823 F.2d 1031, 1049 (7th Cir. 1987).
204. Lingle, 486 U.S. at 401.
205. Id. at 408.
206. Id. at 407.
207. Id. at 410.
208. 868 F.2d 1057 (9th Cir. 1989).
209. Id. at 1063.
210. Id.
211. See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 213 (1985) (stating that § 301 preempts
state claims that are inextricably intertwined with the terms of a collective bargaining
agreement).
212. See Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 413 (1988) (stating that fed-
eral law does not preempt claims which are analytically independent of the collective bargaining
agreement).
213. Shane v. Greyhound Lines Inc., 868 F.2d. 1057, 1063 (9th Cir. 1989).
214. 817 F.2d 536 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 484 U.S. 908 (1987)).
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In Tellez, the defamation claim was premised on a manager's distri-
bution of eleven copies of a letter accusing an employee of buying
cocaine on the job.215 The collective bargaining agreement did not
require the manager to send written notice of the employee's suspen-
sion or establish parameters for such notices.216 Consequently, the
Ninth Circuit concluded that the resolution of Tellez's defamation
claim did not require "interpretation or consideration of the agree-
ment" and that preemption did not occur.21 7
2. Railway Labor Act Preemption
The RLA also preempts state law claims arising out of "minor dis-
putes" (or grievances under labor agreements), no matter how charac-
terized.21 8 State law tort claims, including defamation, may thus be
preempted by the RLA.
a. The Pre-Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris Case Law
Prior to the Supreme Court's 1994 decision in Hawaiian Airlines,
Inc. v. Norris,2 19 courts recognized that the RLA could preempt defa-
mation claims when the alleged statements were made in connection
with grievance procedures required by the collective bargaining agree-
ment and the RLA.220
In the companion cases of Barchers v. Missouri Pacific Railroad
Co.22 ' and Alsbury v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co.,22 2 two employees
sought to premise their defamation claims upon letters sent among
supervisory employees in connection with an investigation of their
misconduct.2 23 The letter used especially strong language, including
the statement that "I have run across some lousy and rotten people in
my time and those two rank close to the top as being the worst I have
seen. 22 4 Finding that the dispute "grew out of" a grievance as de-
215. Id. at 537.
216. Id. at 538.
217. Id.
218. Magnuson v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 576 F.2d 1367, 1369-70 (9th Cir.), cert denied,
439 U.S. 930 (1978).
219. 114 S. Ct. 2239 (1994).
220. Id. at 2246-49.
221. 669 S.W.2d 235 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
222. 670 S.W.2d 87 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
223. Alsbury, 670 S.W.2d at 87; Barchers, 669 S.W.2d at 236.
224. Alsbury, 670 S.W.2d at 88; Barchers, 669 S.W.2d at 237. The full text of the letter was
equally unflattering:
In addition to information contained in the investigation and write-up from Trainmas-
ter W. E. Richmond, these two gentlemen had been a problem for quite some time in
that it was necessary to counsel this crew quite frequently for their failure to perform
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scribed by the RLA, the Missouri Court of Appeals concluded the
claims were preempted.22 5
In DeTomaso v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.,226 the airline
learned that three bins of salvage it sold to an employee contained
some abandoned material.22 7 An airline security official accompanied
an FBI agent to the employee's home, made statements concerning
the impropriety of the employee's possession of the material, and con-
fiscated the cargo.228 The airline subsequently discharged the em-
ployee for "fraud, dishonesty and abuse of company policy. '2 29 The
employee successfully grieved his discharge and filed an action for
defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress in state
court.
2 3 0
The California Supreme Court held that the employee's claims for
defamation were preempted.231 It found that the statements were
made during a factual investigation required by the collective bargain-
ing agreement. 232 It specifically found that the RLA preempted
claims premised upon statements made during proceedings or investi-
gations required by labor agreements. 233
Indeed, the Court found that the employee's claims threatened to
undermine "the value of arbitration as a dispute resolution tool.
'234
The Court expressed concern that if claims such as the employee's
were permitted, courts would become "forums to resolve arbitral dis-
putes," and "employees [could] make an end run thereby avoiding the
carefully crafted congressional procedures set forth in the RLA. ' 235
work as requested by General Mills. They had a tendency to do the work to suit them-
selves, regardless of how General Mills requested their plan to be set up. They continu-
ally argued with the foreman at General Mills and at least three times a week I would
receive a telephone call from General Mills' Traffic Manager in regard to these two
gentlemen. Although neither General Mills or us were able to catch or prove it, we felt
these gentlemen were stealing flour from the mill. Since their dismissal, General Mills
tells me they have had no problems. I have run across some lousy and rotten people in
my time and these two rank close to the top as being the worst I have seen. I would be
very hopeful that we would not be required to return them to service as they represent
a very poor image of the Missouri Pacific.
AIsbury, 670 S.W.2d at 87-88; Barchers, 669 S.W.2d at 236-37.
225. Alsbury, 670 S.W.2d at 88; Barchers, 669 S.W.2d. at 237.
226. 733 P.2d 614 (Cal.), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 829 (1987).
227. Id. at 615.
228. Id. at 616.
229. Id. at 617.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 624.
232. Id. at 621-22.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 620-21.
235. Id. at 621.
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The Sixth Circuit reviewed allegedly defamatory statements arising
out of dispute resolution procedures in Miller v. Norfolk & Western
Railway Co.236 The employee claimed that his supervisor defamed
him in disciplinary proceedings held pursuant to a collective agree-
ment by making false statements regarding his participation in a
scheme to defraud the railroad.2 37 The district court concluded that
because the statements were made in connection with a hearing held
under a labor contract, the RLA preempted the employee's claims. 238
The Court of Appeals found that the plaintiff's claim was simply an
effort to "evade the exclusive jurisdiction of the [National Railroad
Adjustment Board] by characterizing [the] claims as state causes of
action. '239 Thus, the Court held that the plaintiff's claims were inex-
tricably intertwined with the agreement and affirmed their
dis'missal.240
In a 1992 decision, the Fourth Circuit considered whether a defama-
tion claim arising from the posting of a notice of disciplinary charges
against an employee and the date for a hearing was preempted by the
RLA. In Lorenz v. CSX Transport, Inc. ,241 the collective bargaining
agreement required that the employee be given written notice of the
specific charge against him and that he have an opportunity to present
witnesses.242 It did not, however, require that the notice be posted as
it was.243
The majority in Lorenz found that the defamation claim was pre-
empted because it arose from a notice "incident" to the grievance pro-
cess.244 It declared:
The [labor agreement] required the notice to be given before an
employee could be disciplined. The allegedly defamatory statement
is, facially, a simple recitation of the charges against Lorenz and
notice of a hearing which CSX was required to hold. This act was
inextricably intertwined with the grievance procedures ... and this
dispute cannot be settled without reference to [the agreement] and
the grievance procedures mandated by it.2 45
236. 727 F. Supp. 365 (N.D. Ohio 1989), aff'd, 917 F.2d 24 (6th Cir. 1990).
237. See Miller v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 834 F.2d 556 (6th Cir. 1987) (presenting an
earlier decision on appeal).
238. See Miller, 727 F. Supp. at 366-67 (presenting the decision on remand).
239. No. 89-4101, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 19129, at *10 (6th Cir. Oct. 25, 1990).
240. Id. at *15.
241. 980 F.2d 263 (4th Cir. 1992). The notice stated in pertinent part: "You are charged with
insubordination and unauthorized removal and/or theft of company property when you failed to
follow instructions..." Id. at 265-66.
242. Id. at 265.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 268.
245. Id.
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The dissent, presaging a future Supreme Court decision, rejected
this analysis and instead applied the preemption test formulated in
Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc.246 In so doing, Judge
Sprouse maintained that the labor agreement did not require the post-
ing of the notice and that Lorenz's defamation claim "would exist with
or without the collective bargaining agreement. ''247
Finally, in Henegar v. Banta,248 the Sixth Circuit once again consid-
ered the preemption of defamation claims premised upon statements
occurring during an investigation and hearing mandated by the
RLA.249 Kenneth Henegar was employed as a brakeman by the Nor-
folk & Western Railway Company and covered by a labor agreement
which required a formal hearing before the imposition of discipline.250
William Banta, a trainmaster, was Henegar's immediate supervi-
sor.25 ' He formally charged Henegar with having provided false and
conflicting statements concerning an alleged on the job injury.252
Banta testified at a disciplinary hearing that the alleged injury, in fact,
was a pre-existing condition.253 The hearing officer dismissed Hene-
gar, finding that his claim of a work-related injury conflicted with the
hospital records and his prior statements.254 Henegar, through his
union, appealed the decision to a public law board which affirmed
Henegar's dismissal.255
Thereafter, Henegar filed an action in court, claiming he was de-
famed by Banta's statements.256 The district court granted Banta's
motion for summary judgment, concluding that the claim was "inextri-
246. 486 U.S. 399 (1988); see supra notes 199-200 and accompanying text. In analyzing prior
case law, Judge Sprouse stated:
Cases in the DeTomaso-Majors line are misleading because they distort the congres-
sional purpose of the RLA. Both the majority and the district court relied on language
in Majors that entertaining Lorenz's action in the district court "would thwart the con-
gressional purpose of providing a comprehensive federal scheme for the settlement of
employer-employee disputes in the railroad industry without resort to the courts."
Lorenz v. CSX Transp., Inc., 980 F.2d 263, 271 (4th Cir. 1992) (Sprouse, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted).
247. Id. at 272.
248. 817 F. Supp. 668 (N.D. Ohio 1993), aff'd., 27 F.3d 223 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
664 (1994).
249. Henegar, 27 F.3d at 224.
250. Id. at 224-25.
251. Id. at 224.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
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cably intertwined" with the collective bargaining agreement and, thus,
preempted by the RLA.257
The Court of Appeals found that Banta's statements were made in
the course of an investigation of Henegar's personal injury claim.25 8
The investigation and hearing were conducted as required by the col-
lective bargaining agreement. 259 Thus, the Sixth Circuit agreed with
the district court that the defamation claim was inextricably inter-
twined with the labor agreement and preempted.260
Significantly, the Sixth Circuit also stated that if the Lingle standard
were applied, preemption would still be found:
[E]ven under Lingle, there would be preemption on the facts of this
case because an 'unprivileged publication' is an element of defama-
tion in Michigan ... and to determine whether Banta's remarks are
privileged, a court would inevitably have to interpret the terms of
the collective bargaining agreement since Banta allegedly made the
statements during a grievance proceeding mandated by the collec-
tive bargaining agreement. 261
Consequently, the facts in Henegar were sufficient to trigger preemp-
tion under both the existing RLA precedent and Section 301 stan-
dards. Henegar was decided in close proximity to the Supreme
Court's 1994 decision in Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris,262 which ex-
amined the standards for RLA preemption.
b. The Impact of Hawaiian Airlines on Railway Labor Act
Preemption Law
In Hawaiian Airlines, the Supreme Court considered the claims of
an airline mechanic that he had been wrongfully discharged in viola-
tion of the public policy contained in the Federal Aviation Act and of
the provisions of Hawaii's Whistleblower Protection Act.263 Norris
had been terminated by the airline when he refused to sign a mainte-
nance record as required by the collective bargaining agreement for a
plane he claimed was unsafe and reported his beliefs to the Federal
Aviation Administration. 264 The state court dismissed these tort
257. Henegar, 817 F. Supp. at 670. Following precedent, the district court also held that the
railroad supervisor could assert preemption against the employee's defamation claim. Id. at 671;
see also Ferguson v. Norfolk Southern Corp., 704 F. Supp. 666 (W.D. Va. 1987) (barring recovery
by employee against his supervisor).
258. Henegar, 27 F.3d at 226.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 227.
262. 114 S.Ct. 2239 (1994).
263. Id. at 2242.
264. Id.
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claims as preempted by the mandatory dispute resolution procedures
of the RLA.265
Justice Blackmun, writing for a unanimous Court, resolved two is-
sues important for RLA preemption analysis. 266 First, contrary to sev-
eral lower court decisions, he found that Section 153 First (i)'s
reference to arbitration for disputes which grow "out of grievances or
out of the interpretation and application of agreements" 267 did not
support preemption independent of a labor agreement.2 68 Instead, he
found the Lingle standard "provides an appropriate framework for
addressing preemption under the RLA" and limited preemption to
disputes involving contractually defined rights.269 Second, the Court
found in applying the Lingle analysis that Norris' state law claims
were independent of the labor agreement and not preempted. 270
Thus, the Court found the Lingle analysis applicable and then applied
it narrowly.
It is impossible to predict the impact Hawaiian Airlines will have on
the preemption of defamation claims arising out of the RLA's
mandatory dispute resolution mechanisms. The Henegar271 and
Shane272 cases which applied the Lingle standard, indicate that there
will be continuing protection for statements made during dispute reso-
lution procedures actually required by labor agreements. 273 How far
this protection will extend beyond statements in required disciplinary
notices and in hearings is unclear and will likely involve a case-by-case
265. Id. at 2243.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 2240.
268. Id. at 2241.
269. Id. at 2249.
270. Id. at 2251.
271. See supra note 248 and accompanying text (illustrating use of the Lingle test to determine
that the claim for defamation was inextricably intertwined with the labor agreement).
272. See supra note 208 and accompanying text (holding that claim based on required dis-
charge notification is inextricably intertwined with the labor agreement).
273. At least one commentator who favors limiting Section 301 preemption believes its use is
appropriate for claims arising out of statements made in grievance proceedings. Michael C.
Harper, Limiting Section 301 Preemption: Three Cheers for the Trilogy, Only One for Lingle and
Lueck, 66 Cm.-KENr L. REV. 685 (1990). Thus, Professor Michael Harper has stated:
[The Ninth Circuit] has held that preemption is appropriate if and only if the state-
ments that are allegedly defamatory are required to be made in the collective agree-
ment. This is correct not because the defamation claim requires the interpretation of
the collective agreement and therefore an application of Section 301 law; but rather
because the risk of a defamation claim could interfere with collective bargaining by
deterring an employer from agreeing to union proposals to grant to employees gener-
ally beneficial processes, such as prompt notice of charges against them. Employer
acceptance even of a grievance arbitration system could be discouraged if fulfillment of
the requirements of that system could result in a defamation suit.
Id. at 745.
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determination. Thus, even in the labor context, preemption does not
provide sufficient protection for statements made during arbitration
proceedings or other non-judicial dispute resolution mechanisms.
B. Collateral Estoppel
1. Requirements of Collateral Estoppel
The doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of factual
issues. 274 A party seeking to invoke collateral estoppel must show:
(a) that the issue previously adjudicated is identical with that subse-
quently presented;
(b) that the prior action ended in a final judgment on the merits;(c) that the estopped party was a party or in privity with a party in
the prior action; and
(d) that the estopped party was given a full and fair opportunity to
be heard on the adjudicated issue in the prior action.275
A party satisfying these elements may properly invoke the doctrine of
collateral estoppel and preclude future claims based on previously liti-
gated issues.276 The doctrine of collateral estoppel "contributes to
efficient judicial administration, serving the public interest in judicial
economy as well as the parties' interests in finality, certainty of affairs
and avoidance of unnecessary relitigation. ''277
Both federal and state courts have found plaintiffs collaterally es-
topped from relitigating facts determined in an arbitration setting. In
Vacca v. Viacom Broadcasting of Missouri, Inc. ,278 a former writer and
editor brought claims for wrongful discharge and breach of employ-
ment contract against the defendant television station and broadcast-
ing company after he was terminated for insubordination. 279 After
274. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 27-29 (1982) ("When an issue
of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determi-
nation is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action be-
tween the parties, whether on the same or a different claim.").
275. Vacca v. Viacom Broadcasting of Mo., Inc., 875 F.2d 1337, 1341 (8th Cir. 1989) (quoting
City of Bismarck v. Toltz, King, Duvall, Anderson & Assoc., Inc., 855 F.2d 580, 582 (8th Cir.
1988)); Robinson v. Hamed, 813 P.2d 171, 175 (Wash. App. Ct. 1991).
276. "The underlying rationale of issue preclusion ... is the idea that the adversary process is
as likely to lead to a correct decision on an issue the first time it is presented as it is the second
time." ROBERT C. CASAD, RES JUDICATA IN A NUTSHELL 150 (1976).
277. Chisholm v. Defense Logistics Agency, 656 F.2d 42, 46 (3d Cir. 1981); see Parklane Ho-
siery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326-27 (1979) (stating collateral estoppel is based upon princi-
ples of fundamental fairness, that the finality of judgments be preserved and that matters not be
relitigated indefinitely). After an issue has been fully litigated, "spending additional time and
money repeating the process would be extremely wasteful." JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL.,
CIVIL PROCEDURE § 14.9, at 658 (1985).
278. 875 F.2d 1337 (8th Cir. 1989).
279. Id. at 1338-39.
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bringing his action, the parties submitted the wrongful discharge claim
to arbitration under the collective bargaining agreement.280 The arbi-
trator found for the defendants. 281 The district court then granted the
defendants' motion for summary judgment on the breach of contract
claim on the ground that the decision of the arbitrator left no genuine
issue of material fact on that claim.282
The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that a crucial issue concerning
the contract claims - the reason for the employee's discharge - was
determined by the arbitrator. 283 Accordingly, collateral estoppel re-
quired acceptance of the arbitrator's finding that the employee was
discharged for refusing to work and summary judgment was proper on
the related breach of employment contract claim. 284
In Torre v. Falcon Jet Corp.,285 an inspector of corporate aircraft was
suspended and later terminated for insubordination. 286 The employee
grieved his discharge as required by the collective bargaining agree-
ment, and the matter subsequently was arbitrated.287 The arbitrator
concluded that just cause existed under the collective bargaining
agreement to warrant disciplinary action but modified the penalty to
suspension without back pay.288
The employee later sued his employer, asserting he was terminated
in violation of the New Jersey Whistleblower Statute. 289 The district
court found that the arbitrator decided the identical issue disputed in
the court action - whether the employee was wrongfully discharged
for having informed the owner of a corporate jet that his employer
improperly performed an aircraft inspection.290 Thus, the court held
that the employee was collaterally estopped from bringing the subse-
quent wrongful discharge claim.291
280. Id. at 1339.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 1341.
284. Id.
285. 717 F. Supp. 1063 (D.N.J. 1989).
286. Id. at 1064.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 1066.
291. Id.; see also Kroeger v. United States Postal Serv., 865 F.2d 235, 239 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(finding administrative law judge properly determined that charge of mishandling postal funds
was fully litigated in arbitration and thus subject to collateral estoppel); Pratt v. Purcell Tire &
Rubber Co., 846 S.W.2d 230 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (holding employee's retaliatory discharge
claim precluded by collateral estoppel where the fa&s had already been tried and determined by
an arbitrator).
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2. Application of Collateral Estoppel to Arbitration Awards
The application of collateral estoppel to defamation actions arising
from arbitrations follows a consistent pattern in the employment con-
text. Typically, a party submits a claim to arbitration to resolve an
existing dispute. Such proceedings may involve the determination of
factual issues - issues which cannot serve as the basis for a subse-
quent defamation action. Collateral estoppel will operate to preclude
a party from relitigating a "controlling fact or question" which was
adjudicated against that party in the former suit.292
In Fulghum v. United Parcel Service, Inc.,293 the employees were
suspected of theft and ultimately discharged following an internal in-
vestigation.294 They grieved their terminations through the union's
formal grievance procedure.295 After their terminations were upheld
by a grievance committee, the employees brought suit against the em-
ployer and their supervisors for, among other things, defamation. 296
The Michigan Court of Appeals held that the employees were
bound by the determinations made during the course of the grievance
proceedings that they were guilty of theft.297 The court found that
national policy strongly favors deference towards the decisions made
during grievance resolution.298 Such procedures can function only if
the courts give the decisions "full play. '299 Concluding that the em-
ployees could not collaterally attack the decisions of the grievance
committees, the court upheld the granting of summary judgment in
the defendant's favor.300 On appeal, the Michigan Supreme Court af-
firmed, quoting the operative language of the court of appeals' deci-
sion in its entirety.301
292. Northern Trust Co. v. Aetna Life & Sur. Co., 549 N.E.2d 712,715 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); see,
e.g., O'Neil v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 654 F. Supp. 347, 351 (N.D. I11. 1987)
(stating where facts underlying two different causes of action are the same, the "issue" is identi-
cal for collateral estoppel purposes).
293. 343 N.W.2d 559 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983), aff'd, 378 N.W.2d 472 (Mich. 1985).
294. Id. at 560.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Fulghum v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 378 N.W.2d 472, 473 (Mich. 1985). In Fulghum, the
decisions at issue were made by a grievance committee (the UPS joint-area committee) com-
posed of labor and management representatives rather than an arbitrator. Id. at 473-74; see also
Ivery v. United States, 686 F.2d 410, 413-14 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1037 (1983)
(holding arbitrator's finding that postal worker actually committed the offense for which he was
discharged collaterally estopped federal tort action for malicious prosecution); Luppo v.
Waldbaum, Inc., 515 N.Y.S.2d 871 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (holding arbitrator's finding that em-
[Vol. 45:677
1996] EXPANDING THE ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE 715
In Sullivan v. American Airlines, Inc.,302 the district court precluded
an employee's defamation action against his employer under the doc-
trine of collateral estoppel following an arbitration award.303 The em-
ployee based his defamation claim upon comments made directly to
him during the course of an investigation for theft of company prop-
erty, including a letter accusing him of dishonesty, and from state-
ments made at an investigation hearing. 3°4
The success of the defamation claim rested on whether the state-
ments accusing the employee of dishonesty were true.30 5 This was the
precise question which was presented to and ultimately decided by the
arbitrator. 306 In light of the evidence presented to the arbitrator and
the subsequent resolution of that question, the court concluded that
the employee was collaterally estopped from relitigating his defama-
tion claim. 307
Similarly, in Robinson v. Hamed,30 8 two employees of an airline had
an altercation while returning from a business trip.309 After an inves-
tigation and disciplinary review, the airline terminated one of the em-
ployees who then filed a grievance challenging his termination. 310 In
an arbitration hearing held pursuant to a collective bargaining agree-
ment, the arbitrator determined that the company had "just cause" to
terminate the employee. 311
Following the conclusion of the arbitration proceeding, the second
employee filed a civil assault claim against the terminated co-em-
ployee.312 The terminated co-employee counterclaimed, alleging,
among other things, defamation. 313 The second employee asserted
that the terminated co-employee was collaterally estopped from reliti-
gating the issue of the truth of the circumstances surrounding the air-
port incident by reason of the arbitration decision.314
ployee had engaged in theft collaterally estopped the employee's malicious prosecution and false
imprisonment action).
302. 613 F. Supp. 226 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
303. Id. at 231-32.
304. Id. at 231.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 231-32.
308. 813 P.2d 171 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991).
309. Id. at 172.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 172-73.
312. Id. at 173.
313. Id.
314. Id.
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The Washington Court of Appeals held that the terminated co-em-
ployee was collaterally estopped from litigating the defamation claim
because the issue decided during the arbitration proceeding-the
truth of the second employee's account of the airport incident-was
identical to the issue presented to the court in the subsequent case.315
The court of appeals made clear that "it is well settled that in an ap-
propriate case the decision in an arbitration proceeding may be the
basis for collateral estoppel or issue preclusion in a subsequent judi-
cial trial. '316
Although courts have generally embraced the application of collat-
eral estoppel to arbitration awards, 317 the use of the doctrine has been
more difficult outside the labor setting. First, an arbitrator may not
resolve the factual issue essential to the preclusion of a defamation
claim. In this situation the defamation issue before the court would
not be identical to the issue ultimately resolved in the arbitration pro-
ceeding. Consequently, it would be difficult to apply collateral estop-
pel. Thus, "the party seeking to invoke collateral estoppel must
convince the Court that the facts giving rise to the arbitration award
are identical to those asserted in the litigation, and that the only dis-
tinction is with respect to the theories of law being asserted. '318
Second, in the labor arbitration context, the resolution of a claim
often depends on a single issue. There may be no difficulty in deter-
mining whether the issue sought to be precluded in a defamation ac-
tion was both actually litigated and necessary to the determination of
the arbitration award. 319 In the commercial arbitration setting, how-
ever, the resolution of factual issues surrounding the alleged defama-
tory statements may not be necessary to the arbitrator's award.320
315. Id. at 174.
316. Id.; see also Taylor v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 656 N.E.2d 134, 140-42 (I1l. App.
Ct. 1995) (holding that collateral estoppel arising from prior arbitration award precluded claims
for malicious prosecution, tortious interference with contract, and negligent hiring); Case
Prestressing Corp. v. Chicago College of Osteopathic Medicine, 455 N.E.2d 811, 814 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1983) (stating in dicta that collateral estoppel applies only to any issues in a subsequent
action which were actually decided in a prior action).
317. G. Richard Shell, Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel Effects of Commercial Arbitration,
35 UCLA L. REV. 623, 647-48 (1988); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1977)
(stating when an issue has been litigated, that judgment is conclusive in subsequent actions be-
tween the parties).
318. Carroll E. Nessemann, The State of the Law, in 1 SECURITIES ARBrrRATION 1992 403, 505
(Practicing Law Institute ed., 1992).
319. Shell, supra note 317, at 651.
320. The party asserting the collateral estoppel effect of the arbitration award has the burden
to prove that the issue was actually determined by the prior judgment. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS § 27(d) (1977). Accordingly, where a party anticipates that an arbitration award
may ultimately be needed for collateral estoppel purposes, it is desirable to obtain a transcript
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Finally, the party against whom preclusion is asserted in a commer-
cial arbitration may not have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
the contested issue. In some instances the factual issues relating to the
alleged defamatory statements may not bear on the outcome of the
dispute and therefore, may not be fully litigated. 321 As a result, collat-
eral estoppel will not be applicable.
This is not to say that collateral estoppel cannot be applied outside
of labor arbitration proceedings. 322 In Corey v. New York Stock Ex-
change,323 an investor who had been unsuccessful in an arbitration
proceeding brought suit against the stock exchange. 324 The investor
argued that he was deprived of a fair hearing in the course of the
arbitration. 325 The court dismissed the suit against the stock exchange
because "the same issues [adjudicated adversely to the plaintiff in ar-
bitration] are present in this action, and because the defendant has
met the conditions for application of collateral estoppel. '' 326 Hence,
collateral estoppel, while useful in particular cases, fails to provide
sufficient protection for the arbitral process.
and request that the award contain detailed findings by the arbitrators. See NESSEMANN, supra
note 318, at 504 (discussing requirements of collateral estoppel).
321. See Shell, supra note 317, at 653 (noting that the party against whom preclusion is as-
serted will often claim the issue was not fully litigated during the arbitral proceeding). Note the
privity requirement of collateral estoppel is readily satisfied and would not pose an obstacle to
the application of collateral estoppel in the commercial arbitration setting. The party asserting
collateral estoppel need not have been a participant in the arbitration proceeding in order to
assert issue preclusion so long as the party against whom issue preclusion is asserted was a party
to or in privity with a party to the same proceeding. See Taylor v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke
Co., 656 N.E.2d 134, 139 (Iil. App. Ct. 1995).
322. In fact, issue preclusion is consistently applied to plaintiffs seeking to relitigate the issue
of damages awarded during an arbitration proceeding. See Ritchie v. Landau, 475 F.2d 151 (2d
Cir. 1973) (holding that an arbitration of the facts precludes relitigation in the courts). Other
courts have given an arbitration decision that meets the appropriate standards the same preclu-
sive effect as judicial decisions. E.g., C.D. Anderson & Co. v. Lemos, 832 F.2d 1097, 1100 (9th
Cir. 1987); Greenblatt v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 763 F.2d 1352, 1360-61 (11th Cir. 1985);
Davis v. Chevy Chase Fin. Ltd., 667 F.2d 160, 172 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United States v. Weiss Pollu-
tion Control Corp., 532 F.2d 1009, 1012 (5th Cir. 1976); see also Mandich v. Watters, 970 F.2d
462, 465 (8th Cir. 1992) (reaffirming that an arbitration award is a prior adjudication for collat-
eral estoppel purposes in Minnesota).
323. 493 F. Supp. 51 (W.D. Mich. 1980), aff'd, 691 F.2d 1205, 1207 (6th Cir. 1982). The arbi-
tration involved a controversy between plaintiff and Merrill Lynch regarding the purchase and
sale of securities. Id. at 55.
324. Id. at 52-53.
325. Id. at 53.
326. Id. at 57.
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V. THE NEED FOR APPLICATION OF THE ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE TO
EXTRA-HEARING STATEMENTS AND ARBITRATION
PROCEDURES
A. Support for the Extension of the Absolute Privilege from Federal
Labor Law and Policy
There is strong support for applying a broad absolute privilege in
the labor grievance and arbitration context. Part III.B of this Article
surveys the cases applying the privilege over a thirty-year period.327
Still, some courts do not apply such protections and others apply the
privilege in a very narrow fashion. 328 This section will analyze labor
policy supporting arbitration and an absolute privilege as articulated
by the Supreme Court.
Some of the Court's most eloquent support for labor arbitration
came in a series of cases since known as the Steelworkers Trilogy
("the Trilogy"). 329 In the Trilogy, the Court sought to eliminate judi-
cial hostility toward labor arbitration and to require the lower courts
to defer to the arbitration process. Further, the Trilogy decisions re-
stricted courts' ability to substitute their judgments for arbitrators'.
Finally, the Trilogy required courts to enforce an arbitrator's award as
long as it drew its essence from the labor contract.
In United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,330 the
Court presented the policy and philosophical underpinnings support-
ing labor arbitration under the NLRA. 331 The court found that fed-
eral policy promoted industrial stability through the labor
agreement.332 The Court viewed arbitration provisions in collective
agreements as a "major factor" in securing industrial peace.333
327. See supra notes 63-161 and accompanying text (discussing the history of absolute privi-
lege in the labor dispute resolution process).
328. See, e.g., Thompson v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., 800 P.2d 1299, 1306 (Colo. 1990), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 973 (1991) (holding that a qualified privilege sufficed to protect the interests of
the national labor policy); Ezekiel v. Jones Motor Co., 372 N.E.2d 1281, 1284 (Mass. 1978) (hold-
ing that an employer enjoyed only a qualified privilege when revealing to a grievance board the
grounds for an employee's termination).
329. See supra note 3 (discussing the courts's decisions in the Steelworkers Trilogy); see gener-
ally Archibald Cox, Reflections upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1959) (urging
judicial restraint from interfering with labor arbitration decisions); Charles B. Carver, Labor
Arbitration as a Continuation of the Collective Bargaining Process, 66 Cmn.-KEN'rr L. REV. 571
(1990) (distinguishing between the limited role of commercial arbitration as an alternative to
litigation and the more vital role of labor arbitration as integral to the collective bargaining
process); Harry Shulman, Reason, Contract and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REV. 999
(1955) (discussing the proper role of the law in the collective bargaining process).
330. 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
331. Id. at 578.
332. Id.
333. Id.
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The Court found that arbitration was a "substitute for industrial
strife" 334 and actually a part of the collective bargaining process. 335
Indeed, the grievance process played a central and pivotal role in the
system of industrial self-government. As the Court reasoned:
[T]he grievance machinery under a collective bargaining agreement
is at the very heart of the system of industrial self-government. Ar-
bitration is the means of solving the unforeseeable by mounting a
system of private law for all the problems which may arise ... the
processing of disputes through the grievance machinery is actually a
vehicle by which meaning and control are given to the collective
bargaining agreement. 336
The opinion also contrasted the role of the arbitrator with that of the
courts by explaining that "[t]he labor arbitrator performs functions
which are not normal to courts; the considerations which help him
may indeed be foreign to the competence of courts. '337
The Court recognized that the arbitrator was not confined to the
express black letter of the labor contract but could also draw upon his
knowledge of "the common law of the shop. '338 Thus, through the
arbitration process, the parties primarily seek to further their joint
goal of "uninterrupted production under the agreement" and to make
the agreement fulfill their particular needs.339 Given these goals,
"[t]he ablest judge cannot be expected to bring the same experience
and competence to bear upon the determination of a grievance be-
cause he cannot be similarly informed. ' 34° Hence, the Warrior & Gulf
Court concluded:
The judiciary sits in these cases to bring into operation an arbitral
process which substitutes a regime of peaceful settlement for the
other regime of industrial conflict. Whether contracting out in the
present case violated the agreement is the question. It is a question
for the arbitrator, not for the courts.341
In 1962, the Supreme Court again considered the role of arbitration
agreements in collective bargaining under the NLRA. In Teamsters
Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co.,342 the union struck over a dispute it had
agreed to submit to binding arbitration.343 The company sued the
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 581 (emphasis added.).
337. Id.
338. Id. at 581-82.
339. Id. at 582.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 585.
342. 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
343. Id. at 96.
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union in state court for damages caused by the strike and received a
judgment in its favor.3"
The Supreme Court read an implied no-strike promise by the union
into the labor agreement. 345 The Court further found that state courts
were not free to apply local rules when enforcing labor agreements. 346
In so doing it declared:
[T]he possibility of conflicting substantive interpretations under
competing legal systems would tend to stimulate and prolong dis-
putes as to its interpretation. Indeed, the existence of possibly con-
flicting legal concepts might substantially impede the parties'
willingness to agree to contract terms providing for final arbitral orjudicial resolution of disputes.347
The Court also addressed situations in which state law might con-
flict with federal labor policy, reasoning:
The ordering and adjusting of competing interests through a process
of free and voluntary collective bargaining is the keystone of the
federal scheme to promote industrial peace. State law which frus-
trates the effort of Congress to stimulate the smooth functioning of
that process strikes at the very core of federal labor policy... [W]e
cannot but conclude that in enacting § 301 Congress intended doc-
trines of federal labor law uniformly to prevail over inconsistent lo-
cal rules.348
Four years later, the Supreme Court considered whether the NLRA
foreclosed a libel action based upon statements made during a union
organizing campaign by a union and its officers. In Linn v. United
Plant Guard Workers,349 an assistant general manager of Pinkerton's
National Detective Agency filed an action against the union, two of its
officers and a Pinkerton employee based upon statements made in
employee leaflets.350 The district court dismissed the libel complaint
on the basis of NLRA preemption and the Court of Appeals
affirmed.351
The Supreme Court found that the NLRA did not preempt the
state defamation action because defamatory statements were only a
"peripheral concern" of the NLRA and because the states' interests in
redressing defamation are "deeply rooted in local feeling and respon-
344. Id. at 97.
345. Id. at 105.
346. Id. at 104.
347. Id.
348. Id. (citations omitted).
349. 383 U.S. 53 (1966).
350. Id. at 55-56.
351. Id. at 55.
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sibility.' '352 The Court recognized that parties frequently use strong
language during labor disputes and that the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) permits this language primarily because the NLRB
cannot prevent it without discouraging free expression of opinion. 353
To balance the states' interest in protecting the reputations of its citi-
zens and the policy of the NLRB in favor of essentially unlimited ex-
pression, the Court held that federal law does not preempt claims
arising from statements made during labor disputes, but that such
statements would be actionable when made with actual malice and
there are actual damages. 354
Justices Fortas and Black registered compelling dissents to the ap-
plication of the actual malice standard, equally applicable to the cir-
cumstances considered here. 355 Justice Black clearly perceived the
mischief created by the majority, declaring:
This new court-made law tosses a monkey wrench into the collective
bargaining machine Congress set up to try to settle labor disputes,
and at the same time extends the law of libel to an even higher level
of importance in the regulation of day-to-day life in this country.356
Justice Fortas felicitously described the nature of the problem:
By arming the disputants with the weapon of libel suits and the
threat of punitive damages, the Court jeopardizes the measure of
stability painstakingly achieved in labor-management relations. It
introduces a potentially disruptive device into the comprehensive
structure created by Congress for resolving these disputes.357
Justice Fortas also viewed the standards used in libel suits as foreign
to the labor relations context:
In a libel suit, the outcome is determined by standards alien to the
subject matter of labor relations, by considerations which do not
take into account the complex and subtle values that are at stake,
and by a jury unfamiliar with the quantity of rhetoric customary in
labor disputes.358
352. Id. at 61.
353. Id.
354. Id. at 65. The Court said that the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964),
standard was adopted "by analogy rather than under constitutional compulsion." Id. The New
York Times "actual malice" standard requires that the defendant made the statement with
knowledge of its falsity or reckless disregard of whether it was false. Id. at 279-80. For articles
discussing the New York Times case, see Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note
on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. Cr. REV. 191; Anthony Lewis,
New York Times v. Sullivan Reconsidered: Time To Return to "The Central Meaning of the First
Amendment," 8 COLuM. J. ART & L. 1 (1983); Bruce L. Ottley et al., New York Times v. Sulli-
van: A Retrospective Examination, 33 DEPAUL L. REV. 741 (1984).
355. Linn, 383 U.S. at 67.
356. Id.
357. Id at 69.
358. Id. at 71.
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The court in Mendicki extended the absolute privilege to statements
in arbitrations based upon the labor policies recognized by the
Supreme Court and the concerns expressed by Justice Fortas in his
dissent in Linn. Notwithstanding its reference to the dissent in Linn,
the Tenth Circuit did not believe its opinion conflicted with that of the
majority.359 It noted that Linn did not involve the resolution of griev-
ances, but was a "borderline" case in which the Supreme Court left
open the possibility of a further extension of protection.360 Similarly,
at least one other court has distinguished Linn because a party suing
over an arbitrable dispute has an avenue to provide "personal relief
and vindication, and does not require a separate cause of action."' 361
While the NLRA and federal labor policy strongly favor arbitration,
it is difficult to conceive of a countervailing interest which would legit-
imately subject the parties, witnesses and other participants to poten-
tial defamation liability. The RLA provides even greater justifications
for application of a broadly-based absolute privilege. The resolution
of "minor disputes" or grievances under the RLA is within the exclu-
sive jurisdiction of the NRAB and of public law boards.362 Moreover,
the vast majority of labor agreements subject to the RLA provide for
an investigation or hearing on the carrier's property before discipline
can be imposed on workers. 363 Thus, carriers in the rail and airline
industries are required to investigate misconduct, issue statements re-
garding discipline of employees and use grievance and arbitration
procedures.
Union representatives must also investigate grievances, correspond
with the carriers, and represent workers before investigations and
public law boards. Plainly, conduct which is reasonably necessary to
adhere to the RLA and labor agreements should be protected by an
absolute privilege. The narrowing of RLA preemption after Hawaiian
Airlines makes the extension of an absolute privilege vital to protect
the statutorily mandated dispute resolution mechanisms.
The qualified or conditional privilege furthers the policies of neither
the NLRA nor the RLA. The qualified privilege can be defeated by
actions which, depending on the jurisdiction, can include excessive
publication, a lack of good faith publication, negligence, common law
359. General Motors Corp. v. Mendicki, 367 F.2d 66, 71 (10th Cir. 1966).
360. Id.
361. Joftes v. Kaufman, 324 F. Supp. 660, 663-64 (D.D.C. 1971).
362. See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
363. See supra note 131 (discussing the procedures followed by railroads in resolving minor
disputes; specifically referring to the investigation and hearing conducted on railroad property).
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malice or "actual malice. ' '364 Thus, at a minimum, an individual sued
for arbitration-related statements will have the expense of defending
the case and establishing that the privilege has not been abused or
that the publication was not made with the requisite malice. These
issues may also be decided by a jury uninformed of the nuances of
workplace disputes or infected with a prejudice toward labor or man-
agement's positions. Since exchanges in arbitration and pre-arbitra-
tion procedures may be heated and profanely frank, a court or jury
frequently may be convinced that sufficient "malice" exists to defeat
the privilege. Consequently, the qualified privilege gives little comfort
to the companies, unions, witnesses and other participants in dispute
resolution proceedings. 365
B. Support for the Extension of the Absolute Privilege Due to the
Nature of Arbitration and Related Procedures
Many courts also have applied an absolute privilege to arbitration
proceedings because of their quasi-judicial nature and functions. This
rationale is independent of federal labor policy and extends to all arbi-
tration procedures. As discussed in Part III of this Article, judges,
court officers, attorneys, parties and witnesses participating in judicial
proceedings all share an absolute privilege. 366 This privilege protects
the entire legal process, including statements in pleadings, briefs, the
courtroom, and in pre-trial procedures such as depositions.367 The
broad protections afforded formal judicial proceedings should be ex-
tended to analogous arbitral and related dispute resolution
procedures.
The courts have at least begun the process of extending these pro-
tections. The vast majority of published decisions find arbitrators, like
judges, are immune from personal liability for their actions and from
entanglement in post-award legal actions.368 Courts in the United
States began providing arbitrators with quasi-judicial immunity in the
nineteenth century. 369 Since that time, arbitral immunity has become
364. See SMOLLA, supra note 14, § 8.07[2], at 8-19, 8-20 (comparing absolute and qualified
privileges); see also POLELLE & OrrT.EY, supra note 15, § 5.40 (listing the elements of condi-
tional privilege in Illinois).
365. See supra notes 112-26 and accompanying text (reviewing court decisions applying a
qualified privilege).
366. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
367. See supra notes 53-62 and accompanying text (discussing the origin and extent of judicial
immunity).
368. See Dennis Nolan & Robert Abrams, Arbitral Immunity, 11 INrDus. REL. L.J. 228 (1989)
(discussing history of and need for arbitrator immunity).
369. See Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344 (1855) (holding that in the absence of evidence of
corruption, the arbitrator's award should be honored lest it become "the commencement, not
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"the almost unquestioned rule in commercial and labor arbitra-
tion. ' 370 While arbitral immunity was first recognized in the commer-
cial arbitration context, it has been applied with equal vitality in the
labor area, in part, because of national labor policy. 371
Arbitral immunity exists to guarantee finality of awards, protect ar-
bitrators' impartiality and independence and to aid in their recruit-
ment.372 The policies supporting the extension of judicial immunity to
arbitrators and arbitral sponsors also support the parallel extension of
the absolute privilege to quasi-judicial bodies and their participants.
The tests for a quasi-judicial body have been defined in a variety of
ways.373 Typically, they include whether the bodies exercise judgment
and discretion, hear and determine facts, examine witnesses, and have
power to affect the rights of private persons.374 As related in Part III
the end of litigation"); Jones v. Brown, 6 N.W. 140 (Iowa 1880) (holding arbitrators act in a
judicial capacity and are not liable in civil actions for their conduct in that capacity); Shiver v.
Ross, 3 S.C.L. (1 Brev.) 293 (1803) (holding that arbitrator's decisions may not be impeached
except in limited circumstances).
370. Nolan & Abrams, supra note 368, at 235-36; see ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 131, at
143-44; MARTIN DOMKE, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 23.01, at 351-354 (Gabriel
M. Wilner ed., rev. ed. 1991) (discussing arbitrator's immunity from liability); see also Corey v.
New York Stock Exch., 691 F.2d 1205, 1208-11 (6th Cir. 1982) (upholding district court's grant of
arbitral immunity to arbitrator acting on behalf of the New York Stock Exchange); Tamari v.
Conrad, 552 F.2d 778, 780 (7th Cir. 1977) (extending arbitral immunity to cases in which the
authority of the arbitrator in a commodities dispute is challenged); Cahn v. International Ladies'
Garment Union, 311 F.2d 113, 114-15 (3d Cir. 1962) (holding labor arbitrator "clothed with
immunity, analogous to judicial immunity" for conduct in capacity of arbitrator); Lundgren v.
Freeman, 307 F.2d 104, 117-18 (9th Cir. 1962) (holding when architects act as quasi-arbitrators in
interpreting contractual terms as between two parties, they enjoy immunity from suit for the
decisions they make); Wagshal v. Foster, No. CIV. A.92-2072 (TPJ), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4073
(D.D.C. Feb, 5, 1993) (dismissing claim against court appointed arbitrator because an arbitrator
acting on behalf of the court possesses that court's judicial immunity); Larry v. Penn Truck Aids,
Inc., 94 F.R.D. 708 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (extending arbitral immunity to joint union/management
arbitration committee); Fong v. American Airlines, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 1340, 1343-44 (N.D. Cal.
1977) (holding in a suit regarding an airline labor arbitrator that "the integrity of an arbitral
process is best preserved by recognizing the arbitrators as independent decision-makers who
have no obligation to defend themselves in a reviewing court"); Corbin v. Washington Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 278 F. Supp. 393, 398-99 (D.S.C.), aff'd, 398 F.2d 543 (4th Cir. 1968) (granting
unqualified immunity to arbitrators in insurance disputes); Hill v. Aro Corp., 263 F. Supp. 324,
325-26 (N.D. Ohio 1967) (citing a series of decisions in a variety of jurisdictions which have
treated arbitrators as quasi-judicial in support of its decision to expand immunity for labor
arbitrators).
371. Nolan & Abrams, supra note 368, at 236; see Hill, 263 F. Supp. at 326 (holding arbitrators
must be protected from fear of consequences for their acts).
372. Nolan & Abrams, supra note 368, at 234-35; see Hoosac Tunnell Dock & Elevator Co. v.
O'Brien, 137 Mass. 424, 426 (1884) (holding that immunity protects judges' impartiality, inde-
pendence and freedom from undue influences, and extending the same immunity to arbitrators).
373. See supra notes 184-88 and accompanying text (discussing the basis for identifying a body
as quasi-judicial in nature).
374. Id.
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of this Article, a great number of courts have found that arbitration
proceedings are quasi-judicial and entitled to an absolute privilege. 375
While arbitrations are not courts, they have many essential similari-
ties. Indeed, many have recognized that arbitral proceedings, whether
in the labor, commercial or securities area, are becoming increasingly
structured and judicial-like. The parties are often represented by
counsel, many arbitrators are attorneys, frequently verbatim tran-
scripts are made, pre- and post-hearing briefs may be filed, objections
on evidentiary issues are ruled upon and written awards are ren-
dered.376 Functionally, the two procedures are virtually the same.377
The majority of the rationales that support protection for partici-
pants in judicial proceedings apply with equal force to arbitrations.
There is no logical reason to confine the privilege's protection to arbi-
trators and leave parties, witnesses and counsel subject to defamation
liability. Those who participate in arbitral and related dispute resolu-
tion procedures should be able to express themselves freely without
375. See, e.g., Mock v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co., 454 F.2d 131, 133-35 (8th Cir.
1972) (discussing criteria for granting quasi-judicial status to an administrative body); Corbin v.
Washington Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 278 F. Supp. 393, 395-97 (D.S.C.), aff'd, 398 F.2d 543 (4th
Cir. 1968) (holding failure to grant absolute immunity in an arbitration would impair its function
as a quasi-judicial proceeding); Sturdivant v. Seaboard Serv. Sys. Ltd., 459 A.2d 1058, 1060 (D.C.
1983) (granting absolute immunity to parties and witnesses at a labor arbitration); Odyniec v.
Schneider, 588 A.2d 786, 789-93 (Md. 1991) (discussing public policy considerations for ex-
tending absolute immunity in certain arbitral proceedings); Kloch v. Ratcliffe, 375 N.W.2d 916,
919-21 (Neb. 1985) (discussing need for absolute immunity in arbitration proceedings); Neece v.
Kantu, 507 P.2d 447, 450 (N.M. Ct. App. 1973) (granting absolute immunity to parties and wit-
nesses in a labor grievance arbitration).
376. For views regarding legalism in labor arbitrations, see Reginald Alleyne, Delawyering
Labor Arbitration, 50 OIo ST. L.J. 93 (1989) (proposing alternatives to legalism in labor arbi-
tration processes); J. David Andrews, A Management Attorney's View, 38 PROC. OF THE NAT'L
ACAD. OF ARB. 191 (1986) (justifying "legalism" in arbitration); Anthony Bartlett, Labor Arbi-
tration: The Problem of Legalism, 62 OR. L. REV. 195 (1983) (examining forces giving rise to
legalism in labor arbitrations); Creeping Legalism in Labor Arbitration, an Editorial, 13 ARB. J.
129 (1958) (lamenting increasing legalism in labor arbitration decisions); see also COOPER &
NOLAN, supra note 3, at 462-92 (providing a variety of critical perspectives on the labor arbitra-
tion process).
For arbitration rule changes by security industry self-regulating organizations since the
Supreme Court's decision in Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, see SECURrIES INDUS-
TRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION, REPORT #8 6-22 (1994) (containing the Uniform Code of
Arbitration) [hereinafter SICA REPORT]; SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBrrRA-
TION, THE ARBITRATOR'S MANUAL (1992).
377. Arbitration involves safeguards sufficient to justify an absolute privilege. See AAA
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES 6-20 (1993) (permitting legal representation, a stenographic
record, interpreters, oaths for witnesses, subpoenas for witnesses, and requiring a written
award). In most situations, arbitration is voluntarily selected. Arbitrations are guided by rules,
industry codes, other arbitral decisions and case law. See SICA REPORT, supra note 376, at 6-22
(Uniform Code of Arbitration). While the grounds are narrow, arbitral awards can be over-
turned. See The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 9-11; the RLA, 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (q)
(stating grounds for setting aside an award).
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regard to liability or harassment, as long as their statements have
some relation to the issues involved. Further, because witnesses in
arbitrations can be compelled to testify, it would be unfair to permit a
defamation claim premised upon that testimony.
Courts have held statements in judicial proceedings to be absolutely
privileged if related or pertinent to the matter before the court.378
This relationship requirement has been liberally interpreted with
doubts resolved in favor of relevancy or pertinency.3 79 The same in-
terpretation should also be extended to arbitral proceedings. Putting
arbitral proceedings on the same plane as courts is further supported
by articulated labor policy and by the Federal Arbitration Act's liberal
policy favoring arbitration agreements. Many courts even make arbi-
tration available to litigants for dispute resolution.
The parties' selection of arbitration-type procedures should not sub-
ject them to liability when in a court they, their counsel and witnesses
would be fully protected. This potential liability is a disincentive
which may outweigh the savings in cost and time thought to exist in
arbitration. Defamation actions should not be exalted over public and
labor policy as the ultimate means to resolve disputes. Although col-
lateral estoppel may lessen attacks on arbitral awards, it is limited to
issues actually decided and to judicial-type decision-making. The nar-
row and carefully drafted grounds for reviewing arbitration decisions
also are circumvented by unrestrained defamation actions arising out
of the process. The finality expected in these proceedings is nullified
if the issues can be reformulated as defamation claims and tried
before a jury.
C. A Framework for the Application of the Absolute Privilege in
the Arbitral Context
A straightforward framework can be constructed for the application
of the absolute privilege in arbitration and related dispute resolution
procedures. First, all statements, oral or written, made in the arbitra-
tion hearing by the parties, counsel or witnesses should be absolutely
privileged. Second, notices, statements of claim, briefs and awards
should also be protected if required or permitted in the proceedings.
Pre-arbitration statements such as those in grievance conferences, dis-
ciplinary investigations, pre-hearing conferences, depositions, corre-
378. See supra note 58 (discussing the limitation of absolute immunity to those matters before
the court).
379. See supra note 58 (discussing application of judicial immunity).
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spondence between parties and the arbitration sponsors relating to the
proceeding must also be protected.
Finally, pre-arbitration statements "reasonably necessary" to pre-
pare for the proceedings and post-arbitration statements to comply
with the award should also be covered. In order to be protected, of
course, all statements must be related or pertinent to the proceedings
as those terms are applied in the judicial context.
This framework will provide significant protection for those partici-
pating in arbitration and related proceedings. No extensive litigation
will be required over issues of good faith, excessive publication or
malice. At the same time, this standard will still allow gratuitous, ir-
relevant statements unrelated to the dispute to be challenged by a def-
amation action. It will provide equivalent protection for arbitral and
judicial proceedings.
VI. CONCLUSION
Statements made in arbitrations and related dispute resolution pro-
cedures are frequent targets of defamation actions brought by partici-
pants who, rightly or wrongly, are dissatisfied by the outcome.
Regardless of motivation, these actions undermine and subvert the
process. Historically, courts have responded by applying a qualified
or limited absolute privilege, federal preemption in the labor arena, or
collateral estoppel. Each of these responses may be inadequate to
protect the arbitration process and the participants.
Qualified privileges provide inadequate protection because they
may be overcome by lack of good faith, excessive publication, or mal-
ice. Since a costly jury trial may be required to resolve these issues,
the limited protection forces the parties to incur risks and costs they
undoubtedly wished to avoid by selecting arbitration in the first
instance.
Federal preemption, a potentially strong protection, has been nar-
rowed by three Supreme Court decisions which restrict it to state-
ments required by collective bargaining agreements or to instances in
which the claim requires the construction or application of the labor
contract. Preemption is of limited utility here because it must be ap-
plied on a case-by-case basis, and it looks to the statements' relation
to collective agreement rather than to protecting the integrity of the
arbitral process.
Collateral estoppel applies to some arbitration decisions but is lim-
ited in scope and requires a final judgment on the merits. These limi-
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tations may all but eliminate application of the doctrine in the arbitral
or alternative dispute resolution context.
Finally, even a narrowly applied absolute privilege may not prop-
erly shield the arbitration proceedings. If only statements made in the
hearing itself are protected, the parties are exposed to liability for
statements in pre-arbitral proceedings or documents, such as state-
ments of claim, pre-hearing conferences, disciplinary notices, corre-
spondence, depositions, or grievance committee sessions.
Public policy, labor law and the Federal Arbitration Act require
that greater protection and certainty be given to arbitrations and re-
lated dispute resolution proceedings. Parties should not be exposed to
additional liability because they have bowed to public or labor policy
and have selected non-judicial dispute resolution procedures. Accord-
ing those involved in arbitration procedures the same protection af-
forded in court litigation not only supports the policies favoring
arbitration, but implicitly recognizes it as a legitimate substitute.
